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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is every parent's worst fear that their child will be born with 
a debilitating birth defect. Equally tragic is the harsh reality con-
fronting the child who must cope with the physical, emotional, and 
economic burdens precipitated by her handicap. I Advances in medical 
genetics have brought about greater scientific understanding of birth-
related disorders, and concomitant improvements in the ability of 
medical providers to diagnose and treat many congenital anomalies 
during the early stages of fetal gestation. Diseases such as Down's 
syndrome2 and Tay-Sachs,3 which until recently were difficult to 
I. Use of the feminine pronoun in this Article encompasses both genders. 
2. For a medical description of Down's syndrome, see infra note 31. 
3. For a medical description of Tay-Sachs disease, see infra note 52. 
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diagnose in utero, are now capable of defection soon after and even 
before a child is conceived.4 
Advances in prenatal diagnoses and treatments have heightened 
expectations that certain genetic conditions will be averted either by 
allowing parents the opportunity to avoid the pregnancy or by 
correcting the condition in utero. Unfortunately, diagnosable genetic 
conditions sometimes remain undiagnosed because of negligent med-
ical care, thus resulting in the birth of a handicapped child and the 
initiation of lawsuits against obstetricians, gynecologists, and genetic 
counselors.s One cause of action which is more frequently visiting 
those rendering medical care for the unborn, and which has generated 
sharp legal, philosophical, and ethical debate among jurists, is the 
tort action for wrongful life. 
In theory, the wrongful life action provides the framework upon 
which a child may recover both pecuniary (special) and nonpecuniary 
(general) damages after convincing the trier of fact that she would 
have been better off not having been born than to live life with 
severe disability.6 Courts, however, have been reluctant to embrace 
the wrongful life action which, they contend, is premised solely on 
the metaphysical assumption that nonexistence is preferable to life 
with disability. For this reason courts have uniformly rejected wrong-
ful life claims for general damages, and all but a few have rejected 
claims for special damages. 7 
4. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 4g3, 491 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
Many chromosomal disorders are detectable through genetic screening of po-
tential parents before a child is conceived. See, e.g., Naccash v. Burger, 290 
S.E.2d 825, 827 (Va. 1982) (Tay-Sachs disease). For a description of genetic 
counseling and some of the various diagnostic procedures utilized in the 
counseling process, see infra Part III.B. 
5. The term "genetic counselor" encompasses a wide variety of medical providers 
involved in evaluating and disseminating information and advice to potential 
parents regarding the risk of giving birth to a handicapped child. See infra 
notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
6. Preventable disease is not the focus of the wrongful life action. If the disease 
is curable, then the nonexistence comparison is not required. See, e.g., Empire 
Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1195 (Colo. 
1989) (en banc). 
7. The following jurisdictions recognize the wrongful life action, although in every 
instance recovery has been limited to pecuniary damages: Turpin v. Sortini, 
643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); 
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). See also 
infra Part II.B. 
Many more intermediate appellate courts have recognized the wrongful life 
action, although in every instance they have been overruled by their state's 
court of last resort. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 
477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing general and special damages), modified, 
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (allowing only special damages); 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co., 713 P.2d 384 (Colo. App. 
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This Article examines the wrongful life action with a critical 
view toward those courts that have refused to compensate children 
who must live and suffer as a consequence of negligent medical care. 
Part One reviews a small sampling of the many appellate decisions 
on wrongful life and related actions. Part Two analyzes the wrongful 
life action against the five elements of the traditional tort framework: 
duty, breach, causation, injury/damage and public policy.8 Part Three 
proposes a strict liability approach as a means of avoiding the life 
versus nonlife dilemma presented by the wrongful life action. Finally; 
Part Four concludes that the choice confronting the parent, the child, 
and the courts, all of whom must decide that a particular life is not 
worth living, is a difficult one. Yet the plight of the handicapped 
child and the need to deter negligent medical care necessitate recon-
sideration of the issue by the vast majority of courts which have 
refused to a~ard any damages for wrongful life.9 
1985) (refusing to reach issue of damages recoverable), overruled, Lininger v. 
Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 
480 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing special damages), rev'd in part, 
512 N.E.2d 1I91 (Ill. 1987); Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing general and special damages), rev'd in part, 
575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991); Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 1I0 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1977) (allowing general and special damages), modified sub nom. Becker 
v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); AzzoIino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E.2d 
567 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing gel)eral and special damages), rev'd in 
part, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985). 
8. Public policy is treated in this Article as a separate tort element. See infra 
Part III.E. 
9. The following courts refuse to recognize the wrongful life action in any form: 
Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735 
(Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (en 
banc); Donnelly v. Candlewood Obstetric-Gynecological Assocs., No. 30-20-96 
(Conn. App. Ct. June 8, 1992); Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 571 
A.2d 786 (Del. 19'89) (en banc); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 
1987); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Atlanta 
Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson,.I398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Blake 
v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 
N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 
1991); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Pitre v. Opelousas 
Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1I51 (La. 1988); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 
(Mass. 1990); Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 332 
N.W.2d 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982,; Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 
N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986) (en banc) (construing MINN. STAT § 145.424 (1984»; 
Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 893 (1989); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 
386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 
185 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 1I0 (Pa. 1981) (plurality 
decision); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 
332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 
372 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982). 
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II. WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THESE DISTINCT BUT RELATED TORT 
ACTIONS 
An action for "wrongful life" is brought on behalf of a hand-
icapped child against a medical provider for depriving her parents 
of medical information necessary for them to make an informed 
decision not to conceive or to terminate a pregnancy. The child does 
not accuse the medical provider of causing the birth defect with 
which she is born; the defect is attributable to a genetic condition 
of on'e or both of her parents or to an independent teratogenic 
sourcelO and cannot be prevented without preventing the child's life. 
Wrongful life, like other negligence actions, seeks to compensate 
the victim by comparing the condition the victim would have occupied 
had the defendant not acted negligently (the otherwise condition)ll 
10. See, e.g., Empire Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 
1191, 1195 (Colo. 1988) (en banc). A significant cause of fetal malformation 
is exposure to various drugs, viruses, chemicals and radiation, which, although 
not genetic in origin, necessitates careful genetic evaluation. Exposure may 
result from maternal drug or alcohol abuse, ingestion of drugs for therapeutic 
purposes, or workplace exposure to certain substances. NELSON: TEXTBOOK OF 
PEDIATRICS 479 (Richard E. Behrman et al. eds., 12th ed. 1983). 
Certain drugs are known for their teratogenic effects. Thalidomide, widely 
prescribed to pregnant women in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s to control 
"morning sickness," diethylstilbestrol (DES), used to prevent spontaneous 
abortions, and the anticonvulsant drug Dilantin TM (phenytoin) to control grand 
mal seizures in epileptics, are teratogens known to cause profound fetal 
malformations. Id. at 324-26. Other suspected teratogens include agent orange, 
dioxin, phenopolybicarbons (PCBs) and benzine. For a more complete descrip-
tion of those substances known or thought to be teratogenic, see generally 
KENNETH L. GoRVEZ & SANDRA G. MARCHESE, GENETIC COUNSELING FOR 
CLINICIANS 250-68 (1986); Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights 
of the Fetus, 5 J. LEG. MED. 63,66-73 (1984); Harold Kalter & Josef Warkany, 
Congenital Malformations: Etiological Factors and Their Role in Prevention, 
308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 424 (1983). 
It is important for the purpose of the wrongful life analysis to distinguish 
those cases where the child's mother could have discontinued ingestion of the 
teratogen so as to avoid injuring the fetus, from those cases where the mother, 
for medical reasons, had no option but to continue her ingestion to the physical 
detriment of the fetus. In the former cases, the mother very well could have 
discontinued her treatment to ensure the health of her fetus and could have 
given birth to a healthy child. Maternal drug abuse cases therefore do not raise 
issues of wrongful life because a healthy life is attainable. See supra note 6. 
In the latter cases, however, the child's claim against the product manufacturer 
is one for wrongful life because the only way to avoid the child's defect would 
have been to avoid her birth altogether. See Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 
N.E.2d 171, 181-82 (Mass. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 
483, 491 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
11. The "but for" condition of the impaired infant is sometimes described in this 
Article as her "otherwise condition." This phraseology is borrowed from E. 
Haavi Morreim, The Concept of Harm Reconsidered: A Different Look at 
Wrongful Life, 7 LAW & PHIL. 3, 10 (1988). 
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and the condition in which the plaintiff finds herself after the tort. 
If the victim is worse off after the tort than before, she has been 
harmed and damages should be awarded. This comparison is partic-
ularly difficult in wrongful life cases because the otherwise condition 
the child claims she prefers is no life at all rather than life with 
handicap. The trier of fact is therefore asked to assess damages 
against the tort feasor for eliminating the child's chance of having no 
life at all. This necessarily requires an assessment of the value and 
benefit of nonexistence which mortals know nothing about.12 Wrong-
ful life plaintiffs typically sue for the extraordinary expenses occa-
sioned by their handicaps, and for the pain and suffering and 
emotional distress brought about by their impaired existence. 
Parents of the handicapped child usually bring their own claim 
for "wrongful birth." The child's life is injurious to them, they 
allege, because they must live with and care for a: child who will not 
live a normal, healthy life. Unlike the wrongful life action, an action 
for wrongful birth does not require a comparison between the child's 
life with a handicap and nonexistence. Rather the focus is on the 
otherwise condition of the parents who claim to prefer life without 
that particular child or, in some cases, eternal childlessness to par-
enthood with a handicapped child. 13 Parents bringing wrongful birth 
claims usually seek lost wages, child rearing expenses, pain and 
suffering and emotional distress damages and reimbursement for the 
extraordinary expenses occasioned by the child's handicapY 
12. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692-93 (N.J. 1967), overruled in part by, 
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979), discussed infra at notes 16-28 and 
accompanying text. 
13. In some cases state-of-the-art technologies make it possible for parents to claim 
they were deprived of the opportunity to substitute a healthy fetus for a 
handicapped one. See Philip G. Peters, Protecting the Unconceived: Nonexist-
ence, Avoidability, and Reproductive Techn%gy, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 487, 518 
(1989) (artificial fertilization techniques may allow prospective parents to replace 
genetically defective gametes with normal ones). 
14. The similarity and indiscriminate use of the terminology associated with the 
various birth-related tort actions require clarification for the purpose of this 
Article. Actions for wrongful life and wrongful birth are distinguishable from 
tort actions for wrongful pregnancy and wrongful conception. The facts of a 
particular case, and not the terminology employed by the courts in their 
decisions, dictate the classification. 
Wrongful pregnancy actions involve a medical provider'S failure to diagnose 
an unplanned pregnancy, which prevents the mother from aborting. The child 
is born healthy. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1316 
(D.S.C. 1983). Wrongful conception actions involve failed sterilization or 
contraception procedures that result in the birth of an unwanted but healthy 
child. The two actions are very similar to one another. See Jones v. Malinowski, 
473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990): Girdley 
v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1992) (en banc). Parents bringing wrongful 
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Wrongful life and wrongful birth actions are relatively recent in 
origin, having surfaced less than thirty years ago. IS From the time 
these actions were first brought in American courts, judicial decisions 
have followed a clear course paralleling the progression of the con-
stitutional right to practice birth control and to procure abortions. 
The following cases illustrate the natural progression of the wrongful 
life and wrongful birth actions and are representative of the various 
approaches taken by those courts which have either allowed or 
disallowed the claims of both parent and child. 
A. Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Before Roe v. Wade 
The first appellate decision addressing a wrongful life claim by 
a handicapped child was the 1967 New Jersey Supreme Court decision 
pregnancy or wrongful conception actions normally sue for the cost of "raising 
the child to its age of majority, the cost of the unsuccessful medical procedure, 
lost wages and consortium during the pregnancy, and compensatory damages 
for pain and suffering. Courts are divided on whether and to what extent 
parents may recover child rearing costs. Compare Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. 
Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991) (allowing full child rearing expenses without 
offset of the intangible noneconomic benefits to the parents from the child's 
life) and Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990) (same) with 
Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d at 429 (allowing child rearing expenses offset 
by the intangible value to the parents from the child's life) and Burke v. Rivo, 
551 N.E.2d 1 (same) with O'Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1985) 
(disallowing child rearing expenses altogether) and Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 
453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982) (same). This Article elaborates no further on the 
wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy actions. For further discussion 
of those actions, see generally Jennifer Mee, Note, Wrongful Conception: The 
Emergence of a Full Recovery Rule, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 887 (1992); Cause of 
Action Against Physician for Wrongful Conception or Wrongful Pregnancy, 
in 3 SHEPARD'S CAUSES OF ACTION 83 (1987 & Supp. 1993). 
15. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), overruled in part by Berman 
v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). Some jurists cite the case of Zepeda v. 
Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) 
as the first reported wrongful life case. Zepeda was a case brought by a healthy 
child who claimed injury for being born into a life of illegitimacy. Such status-
type harm is not the basis of a true wrongful life action since the child, 
although injured by her impaired status, is otherwise physically healthy at 
birth. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1980); see also Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (finding paramount difference between illegitimate and severely handi-
capped children alleging wrongful life); Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 
656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (wrongful life action barred where child is born out 
of wedlock and is otherwise healthy); Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 
630, 635 (Ind. 1991) (child had no cause of action against nursing home for 
negligence that resulted in his birth to retarded mother incapable of providing 
care and support); Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343, 344 (N.Y. 1966) (child 
had no cause of action against state for negligence resulting in child's birth to 
a' retarded mother within the care of the state). 
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in Gleitman v. Cosgrove.16 Sandra Gleitman cQntracted rubella early 
in her pregnancy. Her physicians advised her that the infectiQn WQuid 
nQt affect her unbQrn child;17 hQwever her SQn, Jeffrey, was subse-
quently bQrn with severe auditQry and sight impairments as a result 
.of his mQther's rubella infectiQn. Jeffrey and his parents sued the 
physicians fQr failing tQ render CQrrect advice regarding the likelihQQd 
that Jeffrey WQuid be bQrn with his defects. Had prQper advice been 
given, Jeffrey's mQther alleged she WQuid have procured an abQrtiQn 
tQ aVQid his birth. 
The New Jersey Supreme CQurt denied the Gleitmans' claims 
fQr wrQngful life and wrQngful birth because bQth claims failed tQ 
allege essential elements .of negligence. The majQrity QpiniQn ex-
plained that the claims fQr relief asserted in Gleitman were much 
different than claims fQr prenatal tQrt, where but fQr. the negligence 
.of the medical provider, the child WQuid have been bQrn healthy. IS 
In wrQngful life and wrQngful birth actiQns, the CQurt explained, the 
medical prQvider dQes nQt proximately cause the genetic anQmaly but 
.only causes the birth .of a child with a preexisting cQnditiQn. 19 
In addressing Jeffrey's claim fQr wrQngful life, the CQurt nQted 
the IQgical impQssibility .of cQmparing Jeffrey's cQnditiQn befQre the 
physicians' negligence-nQnexistence, with his present cQnditiQn-life 
with handicap,20 and cQncluded that life, nQ matter hQW impaired, 
"dQes nQt give rise tQ damages cQgnizable at law. "21 The CQurt alsQ 
nQted the difficulty .of evaluating the harm suffered by Mr. and Mrs. 
Gleitman, especially in light .of the intangible benefits .of parenting 
even. a handicapped child such as Jeffrey.22 
The CQurt alsQ PQinted tQ the "cQuntervailing public PQlicy 
sUPPQrting the preciQusness .of human life" as an additiQnal reaSQn 
16. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), overruled in part, Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 
(N.J. 1979) (recognizing parents' wrongful birth claim for general damages). 
17. [d. at 690-91. 
18. [d. at 691 (citing Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.J. 1966». See infra Part 
lILA. for further discussion of prenatal and preconception tort actions. 
19. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692. 
20. The court pointed to Jeffrey's lack of standing to sue as one reason for denying 
his wrongful life action. "'[N]o comparison is possible since were it not for 
the act of birth the infant would n.ot exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff 
cuts from under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to 
prove his damages.''' [d. at 692 (quoting Guido Tedeschi, On Tort Liability 
for "Wrongful Life," 1 ISRAEL L. REv. 513, 529 (1966»; see also Turpin v. 
Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (distinguishing ordinary 
prenatal injury cases from plaintiff's wrongful life claim). 
21. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692. The court believed that if Jeffrey could have been 
asked in utero whether he would prefer nonlife over his life with impairment, 
he would have chosen life. [d. at 693. 
22. Itf. at 693. 
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for disallowing the wrongful life and wrongful birth actions.23 The 
United States Supreme Court had not yet decided Roe v. Wade,24 
and the court in Gleitman felt constrained by the strict limits that 
New Jersey statutes placed on abortion.25 The court concluded that 
"the right to life is i~alienable in our society" and that a "child 
need not be perfect to have a worthwhile life. "26 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jacobs maintained that the law 
should allow reasonable compensation to both parents and child in 
order to alleviate the financial burdens arising from the child's 
impairments and to deter negligent treatment in the futureY The 
problem of ascertaining damages, he reasoned, had not prevented 
damage awards in other difficult contexts and should not preclude 
recognition of wrongful life or wrongful birth claims.28 
For several years following Gleitman, and even after abortion 
rights were firmly entrenched in the law, courts remained loyal to 
the reasoning employed by the majority in Gleitman. Some progress 
was made toward the recognition of wrongful birth in 1977, when 
the Court of Appeals of New York decided two cases consolidated 
for appeal to that court. 29 
In Becker v. Schwartz,30 Delores Becker, age thirty-seven, became 
pregnant and subsequently gave birth to a child afflicted with Down's 
syndrome.31 The parents sued their medical providers for failing to 
23. [d. 
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
25. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692-93; see also id. at 703 (Francis, J., concurring). 
26. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 693. 
27. [d. at 703 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
28. [d. at 704 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). Justice Jacobs minimized the difficulty of 
assessing damages: "Surely a judicial system engaged daily in evaluating such 
matters as pain and suffering, which admittedly have 'no known dimensions, 
mathematical or financial,' should be able to evaluate the harm which proxi-
mately resulted from the breach of duty." [d. (quoting Botta v. Brunner, 138 
A.2d 713, 720 (N.J. 1958». 
29. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
30. 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), modified, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 
1978). 
31. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 808. Down's syndrome is caused by the presence of an 
extra chromosome number 21 (trisomy 21). Id. at 808 n.l. The clinical features 
of Down's syndrome include mongolism, mental retardation of varying severity, 
congenital heart disease, and abnormal limb growth. Phillips v. United States, 
508 F. Supp. 537, 539 n.3 (D.S.C. 1980). Depending on the severity of the 
disease, an afflicted child may live a full and rewarding life. See ABC News 
Special, The Perfect Baby (ABC television broadcast, July 18, 1990) (available 
on LEXIS, NEXIS Library, ABCNEW file). Women at risk for giving birth 
to children with Down's syndrome are typically those who become pregnant 
in their late thirties, who have previously given birth to a child afflicted with 
that disease, or who have two or more close relatives with mongolism. Laurence 
E. Karp, The Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease, in IJIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
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disclose the increased risk of giving birth to a retarded child because 
of Mrs. Becker's advanced age, and in failing to perform amniocen-
tesis. 32 The Beckers alleged they would have terminated the pregnancy 
had they been advised of the risks involved.33 
In the second case, Park v. Chessin,34 the Parks sought the 
advice of obstetricians after giving birth to °a child afflicted with 
polycystic kidney disease.35 The defendants had advised the Parks 
that polycystic kidney disease was not a hereditary disorder, and that 
the chance of giving birth to a second child suffering from the same 
condition was "practically nil." 36 Lara Park was subsequently born 
suffering from polycystic kidney disease and died two and one-half 
years laterY, The parents sued individually and on behalf of Lara, 
claiming general and special damages for Lara's birth.38 
The Court of Appeals of New York, in the consolidated case 
styled Becker v. Schwartz, denied the infants' causes of action for 
wrongful life in both cases because they failed to allege cognizable 
injury and damage.39 The court refused to recognize that being born, 
even with severe handicap, is an injury cognizable at law, and referred 
to the "very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind 
has placed on human life" and the law's incompetence to resolve 
matters "more properly to be left to the philosophers and the 
theologians."4O The court also pointed to the inadequacy of tort law 
to provide an accurate calculation of damages for being born when 
the child's otherwise condition is nonexistent.41 This calculation, the 
458, 460 (Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty eds., 1981). The "incidence 
of Down's syndrome in the offspring of women under thirty is about one in 
1,500. This figure rises to one in 300 between thirty-five and thirty-nine; one 
in 100 between forty and forty-five; and one in forty between forty-five and 
forty-nine." [d. first trimester amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling can 
detect this abnormality with near perfect accuracy. See infra notes 179-80 for 
further discussion of these diagnostic techniques. 
32. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 808-09. 
33. [d. at 812. 
34. 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), modified sub nom. Becker v. 
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
35. Polycystic kidney disease is a hereditary disorder that is marked by gross 
enlargement of the kidneys and progressive renal failure requiring dialysis and 
sometimes kidney transplantation. A positive history of the disease in a sibling 
is decisive in determining the risk of the disease in future offspring. NELSON, 
supra note 10, at 1356-57. 
36. Park, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111. 
37. [d. 
38. [d. 
39. 386 N.E.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. 1978). 
40. [d. 
41. [d. 
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court concluded, required a choice better left for the state legislature.42 
Although the court denied the infants' causes of action for 
wrongful life, it affirmed the parents' wrongful birth claims for 
specia1 damages. 43 The court reasoned that an affirmative duty was 
owed to the infants' parents to provide the information necessary 
for them to decide in Becker whether to abort the fetus, and in Park 
whether to avoid conceptiorr.44 The breach of such a duty resulted 
in measurable pecuniary loss to the parents in the form of the special, . 
extraordinary costs associated with the care, education, and habili-
tation of the children.45 
The parents' claims for emotional distress damages, however, 
were denied because the court was unwilling to recognize that the 
birth of a handicapped child necessarily results in emotional harm.46 
The court concluded that "notwithstanding the birth of a child 
afflicted with an abnormality, and certainly dependant upon the 
extent of the affliction, parents may yet experience a love that even 
an abnormality cannot fully dampen. "47 Citing the "benefit doctrine" 
of section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which requires 
offset of damages by any benefit derived by the plaintiff from the 
defendant's conduct,48 the court concluded that the benefits of par-
enting even a handicapped child may mitigate any award of pain and 
suffering damages. 49 
42. Id.; see also infra Part III.E.4. for a critical discussion of those courts that 
have deferred to their state legislatures to recognize wrongful life and wrongful 
birth actions. 
43. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 814. 
44. Id. at 813. 
45. Id. at 813-14. 
46. Id. at 814. 
47. Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, the court qualified its denial of general 
damages and implicitly advocated a case-by-case analysis of the severity of the 
child's handicap in determining the right of parents to recover pain and 
suffering damages. Id. Unlike its prior decision in Howard v. Lecher, 366 
N.E.2d 64, 66 (N.Y. 1977), the court in Becker was reluctant to hold that in 
every instance parents would not suffer emotional trauma as a result of the 
doctor's misfeasance. A similar "severity of injury" approach to the wrongful 
life action is discussed infra notes 243-54 and accompanying text. 
48. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 states the benefit doctrine as follows: 
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff 
or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to 
the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit 
conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that 
this is equitable. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT~ § 920 (1979). For further discussion of the 
benefit doctrine and its use in calculating damages in wrongful life cases, see 
infra Part 1ll.D.3. 
49. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 814. 
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B. A Coming of Age for Wrongful Life: Judicial Qualification of 
the Damages Recoverable 
In Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,50 the California Court 
of Appeals was the first appellate court to award general and special 
damages to a child for her wrongful life.51 Shauna Curlender was 
bOrn" with Tay-Sachs diseases2 after a medical testing laboratory 
negligently performed genetic tests on her parents.53 If properly 
performed, the tests would have revealed that both of Shauna's 
parents were carriers of the Tay-Sachs gene, and were at an increased 
risk of conceiving a child afflicted with the disease. 54 Because of the 
incorrect test results, nei~her the Curlenders nor their medical prov-
iders had reason to suspect that Shauna would be born with Tay-
Sachs.55 The Curlenders conceived Shauna, who was born with the 
disease and lived for four years with intense pain and progressive 
loss of motor reaction. 56 The Curlenders, on behalf of Shauna, sued 
50. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
51. See supra note 7 for additional intermediate appellate courts that have awarded 
general and special damages for wrongful life. 
52. Tay-Sachs disease is a neurodegenerative disorder that first manifests mild 
symptoms. After four to six months of normal development, psychomotor 
deterioration begins to occur. NELSON, supra note 10, at 478. By the child's 
first year, her health is visibly and markedly failing: 
The infant, who may have crawled, sat unaided, or even pulled to a 
standing position, rapidly deteriorates both mentally and physically 
by about one year of age. The previously playful and happy infant 
no longer smiles, no longer reacts playfully, no longer recognizes or 
sees his parents and, in fact, rapidly loses all contact with his envi-
ronment. Poor muscle tone soon leads to generalized paralysis; feeding 
difficulties secondary to ineffective deglutination progresses to inani-
tion. The child . . . remains in this totally deteriorated mental and 
physical state until death occurs ... , usually ... by the age of three 
to five years. 
Michael M. Kaback & Robert S. Zeigler, The John F. Kennedy Institute Tay-
Sachs Program: Practical and Ethical Issues in an Adult Genetic Screening 
Program, in ETIDCAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS 131, 131-32 (Bruce Hilton et 
al. eds., 1973); see also Goldberg v. Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406, 411 (Ill. 1986) 
(Clark, C.l., dissenting). 
Blood tests and amniocentesis procedures are used to detect the carrier status 
of the parents and the fetus. In particular, "[i]t is recommended that all Jewish 
couples of Eastern European ancestry be advised that tests for the carrier state 
are available and that prevention of this fatal disease is possible." NELSON, 
supra note 10, at 479. 
53. Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. 
54. Id. at 480 n.4. There is a 25070 chance that a child will be born with Tay-
Sachs disease when both parents are carriers of the aleatory gene. NELSON, 
supra note 10, at 479. 
55. Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. 
56. Id. at 480-81. 
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various medical providers and the testing laboratory on a theory of 
wrongful life." 
The Curlender court discounted the metaphysical problems as-
sociated with the wrongful life action and concluded that it "need 
not be concerned with the fact that had the defendants not been 
negligent, the plaintiff might not have come into existence at all."s8 
Instead, the court adopted an approach that looks prospectively at 
the child's life with impairment, rather than retrospectively into a 
world of unknowns: 
The reality of the "wrongful life" concept is that such a 
plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of 
others. It is neither necessary nor just to retreat into med-
itation on the mysteries of life. We need not be concerned 
with the fact that had defendants not been negligent, the 
plaintiff might not have come into existence at all. The 
certainty of genetic impairment is no longer a mystery. In 
addition, a reverent appreciation of life compels recognition 
that [the] plaintiff, however impaired she may be, has come 
into existence as a living person with certain rights. S9 
Based on this reasoning, the majority in Curlender held a child "may 
recover damages for the pain and suffering to be endured during the 
limited life span available to such a child and any special pecuniary 
loss resulting from the impaired condition. "60 
The rationale employed by the Curlender court in permitting 
recovery of general damages for wrongful life was short-lived. Less 
than two years later, the California Supreme Court, sitting en banc, 
decided Turpin v. Sortini,61 in which the court limited the damages 
recoverable in wrongful life actions to the extraordinary expenses 
occasioned by the child's handicapped life. 62 
Joy Turpin was born with hereditary deafness. 63 She and her 
parents alleged that the defendant audiologist was negligent in failing 
to discover the same disorder in her older sister, Hope.64 Joy's parents 
alleged that a proper diagnosis of Hope's condition would have put 
them on notice of the risk of conceiving a second child with the 
same condition and would have resulted in their decision not to 
57. [d. at 479. 
58. [d. at 488. 
59. [d. (emphasis in original) 
60. [d. at 489. 
61. 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (en bane). 
62. [d. at 965-66. 
63. /d. at 956. 
64. [d. 
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conceive Joy.6S The court allowed the child's claim for special dam-
ages but refused to recognize her claim for general damages.66 
On the issue of special damages, the Turpin majority challenged 
as unsound the notion that life, no matter how impaired, is always 
preferable to nonexistence, and questioned whether there was any 
"societal consensus" on that viewY The court acknowledged instead 
"the right of each individual to make his or her own determination 
as to the relative value of'life. and death."68 Recognizing that an 
unborn child is never able to assert its own preference, the court 
adopted the substituted judgment approach advanced by several right-
to-die cases, which permits a family member or other proxy deci-
sionmaker to make a decision based on the patient's best interest. 69 
Noting the impropriety of awarding duplicative damages to both 
the parents and the child for the same special care required during 
the child's minority, the court nonetheless found it illogical to permit 
recovery by the parents instead of the child for the expenses associated 
with the child's own care.70 To hold otherwise, the court concluded, 
would result in the child's dependance upon "the wholly fortuitous 
circumstance of whether the parents are available to sue and recover 
such damages or whether the medical expenses are incurred at a time 
when the parents remain legally responsible for providing such care. "71 
The Turpin court took a contrary view of the child's right to 
recover general damages and aligned itself with the view originally 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 965-66. 
67. Id. at 962-63. The court focused on the relatively minor handicap of the child 
in predicting that a jury would not likely conclude that the child is worse off 
alive than not having been born at all: 
In this case, in which the plaintiff's only affliction is deafness, it 
seems quite unlikely that a jury would ever conclude that life with 
such a condition is worse than not being born at all. Other wrongful 
life cases, however, have involved children with much more serious, 
debilitating and painful conditions, and the academic literature refers 
to still other, extremely severe hereditary diseases. Considering the 
short life span of many of these children and their frequently very 
limited ability to perceive or enjoy the benefits of life, we cannot 
assert with confidence that in every situation there would be a societal 
consensus that life is preferable to never having been born at all. 
Id. (footnote omitted). See infra notes 243-54 and accompanying text for 
further discussion of the severity of injury approach to the wrongful life action. 
68. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 962. 
69. Id. (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976) and Superintendent 
of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423-27 (Mass. 1977». For a 
discussion of the substituted judgment approach in right-to-die and wrongful 
life cases, see infra Part m.D.1. 
70. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 965. 
71. Id. 
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expressed in Gleitman v. Cosgrove72 that human experience does not 
make possible the life-nonexistence comparison necessitated by the 
wrongful life action. 73 The obstacle for the court not only involved 
the practical difficulties of computing damages, but also the inability 
to find any legally cognizable injury in being born.74 The court cited 
the "benefit doctrine"7s as a further reason for denying general 
damages, and concluded that although offset of general damages by 
the intangible benefits of life may be appropriate in wrongful life 
actions, neither "element[] of this harm-benefit equation" can be 
valued in a nonarbitrary way. 76 
One year later, in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 77 the Supreme 
Court of Washington held per certified question that Washington 
recognizes causes of action for wrongful life78 and wrongful birth.79 
In 1970, Jean Harbeson conceived her first child.80 During the course 
of her pregnancy she was diagnosed by physicians as having epilepsy 
and was prescribed the drug Dilantin ™ (phenytoin) to control her 
grand mal seizures. 81 Michael Harbeson was subsequently born 
healthy.8: In 1972, Mrs. Harbeson sought further medical treatment 
for her seizures, and Dilantin was again prescribed.83 Several months 
later, the Harbesons informed three physicians of their desire to 
conceive a second child, and inquired about the risks associated with 
the use of Dilantin during Mrs. Harbeson's pregnancy.84 The doctors 
advised that Dilantin could cause cleft palate and hirsutism,8s but 
failed to warn of the more profound birth defects associated with 
use of the drug during pregnancy.86 In 1974 and 1975, the Harbesons 
72. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), overruled in part by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 
(N.J. 1979). 
73. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 963 (citing Gieitman, 227 A.2d at 711) (Weintraub, C.]., 
dissenting in part). 
74. Id. at 963-64. 
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979); see also supra note 48. 
76. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 964 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979». 
77. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
78. Id. at 497. 
79. Id. at 493. 





85. Hirsutism is a condition characterized by excessive hair growth over various 
parts of the body not normally susceptible to such hair growth. The condition 
may be a normal characteristic in certain ethnic groups or it may develop as 
a result of a metabolic disorder. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 717 (25th 
ed. 199O). . 
86. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 486; see also infra note 87. 
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gave birth to Elizabeth and Christine, both of whom were born with 
fetal hydantoin syndrome.1i7 
The Harbesons brought wrongful birth and wrongful life claims 
against the physicians88 and the pharmaceutical manufacturer for 
failing to warn of the risks associated with the use of Dilantin during 
pregnancy,89 which deprived them of the opportunity to make an 
informed decision not to conceive either child.90 In response to 
questions certified by the federal district court, the Supreme Court 
of Washington held that wrongful birth and wrongful life actions 
are "logical and necessary" and fit within the traditional tort frame-
work for negligence actions. 91 The court certified that the parents 
could recover general and special damages,92 and that the children 
could recover special damages to cover the costs associated with their 
handicaps.93 
The court's primary focus in discussing the Harbesons' wrongful 
birth action was the duty owed to the parents by medical providers 
under the law of informed consent to disclose the information 
necessary for parents to prevent the birth of a handicapped child.94 
87. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 486. Fetal.hydantoin syndrome is a nongenetic disease 
caused by teratogenic exposure to hydantoin. 2 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' DIC-
TIONARY OF MEDICINE F-59 (1993). Abnormalities associated with fetal hydan-
toin syndrome include "mild to moderate growth deficiencies, mild to moderate 
developmental retardation, wide-set eyes, lateral ptosis (drooping eyelids), hy-
poplasia of the fingers, small nails, low-set hairline, broad nasal ridge, and 
other physical and developmental defects." Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 486. 
88. Mrs. Harbeson was treated by physicians at the Madigan Army Medical Center, 
the medical care facility at the McChord Air Force Base where her husband 
was stationed. The Madigan physicians were agents of the United States Air 
Force, and suit was therefore brought against the United States pursuant to 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2674-80 (1988). 
Harbeson, 656 P .2d at 486-87. 
89. [d. at 483. The trial court found specifically that an "adequate literature search 
would have revealed the risks associated with Dilantin." [d. at 494. 
90. [d. at 483. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. at 494. 
93. [d. at 497. 
94. [d. at 490-91. Harbeson is one of the only appellate decisions to trea.t actions 
for wrongful life and wrongful birth as actions for breach of informed consent 
rather than medical malpractice. [d. at 490. Other courts have held that 
informed consent applies only to cases involving affirmative and invasive 
treatment and not to genetic counseling. See, e.g., Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 
A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993); Pratt v. University of Minn. Affiliated Hosps., 414 
N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1987) (dictum); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977). 
In Reed v. Campagn%, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held per certified 
question that an action for wrongful birth is a valid claim by parents for 
medical malpractice but not for breach of informed consent. 630 A.2d at 1152-
54. In refusing to recognize the parents' claim for breach of informed consent, 
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The court recognized both the existence of a duty owed by medical 
providers to potential parents to render accurate genetic counseling 
and the right of parents to benefit from state-of-the-art diagnostic 
procedures which can determine genetic abnormalities in the parents 
and their unborn child.9s The court had little difficulty finding that 
the birth of a child is an actionable injury to the parents, but 
experienced greater difficulty determining the proper measure of 
damages to be awarded.96 The court looked to the policy underlying 
existing state statutory provisions and found that the parents could 
recover for their emotional suffering and the extraordinary expenses 
arising from the children's birth.97 Citing the "benefit doctrine" 
however, the court noted that the parents' recovery for emotional 
pain and suffering should be offset by the emotional benefits of 
parenthood.98 
In addressing the children's wrongful life claims, the court held 
the children could recover the extraordinary expenses incurred during 
their adulthood.99 The court recognized that the 
the court noted that under Maryland law, a breach of informed consent occurs 
only upon nondisclosure of a risk associated with an affirmative medical 
treatment that reasonable people would deem material to their decision to 
undergo that treatment. [d. at 1152-53. However, in most cases alleging 
inadequate genetic counseling, the court noted, there is no affirmative treat-
ment, nor should the counselor's conduct be judged simply by considering 
what reasonable people would want to know about the genetic fate of their 
child. [d. at 1153-54. The court reasoned that each situation involving genetic 
counseling is unique and requires professional evaluation of the genetic risks 
and the appropriateness of prenatal testing in light of those risks. [d. at 1154. 
As discussed further Part IV, infra however, certain aspects of genetic 
counseling involve professional discretion, whereas certain mechanical aspects 
of genetic counseling, such as the interpretation of unambiguous test results, 
do not. In those situations involving failed, nondiscretionary genetic counseling, 
imposition of strict liability against the counselor may be appropriate. 
95. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 491. The court noted that "[r]ecognition of the duty 
will 'promote societal interests in genetic counseling and prenatal testing, deter 
medical malpractice, and at least partially redress a clear and undeniable 
wrong.''' [d. (quoting Thomas D. Rogers, III, Wrongful Life and Wrongful 
Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 
S.C. L. REv. 713, 757 (1982». 
96. [d. at 492. 
97. [d. at 492-94. The court found that WASH. REv. CODE § 4.24.010 (1982), which 
provides for parents' pecuniary and nonpecuniary recovery for loss sustained 
as the result of an injury to their child, did not apply because "a wrongful 
birth claim does not allege injury to the child as the cause of the parents' 
injury ... ." Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 493. Nonetheless, the court found that 
the policy underlying § 4.24.010-to compensate parents for emotional injury-
is promoted by recognizing claims for wrongful birth. [d. 
98. [d. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979»; see also supra note 
48. 
99. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495. 
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need for medical care and other special costs attributable to 
his defect will not miraculously disappear when the child 
attains his majority. In many cases, the burden of those 
expenses will fallon the child's parents or the state. Rather 
than allowing this to occur by refusing to recognize the 
cause of action, we prefer to place the burden of those costs 
on the party whose negligence was in fact a proximate cause 
of the child's continuing need for such special medical care 
and training. tOO 
The Harbeson court analyzed the infants' wrongful life action 
under the same tort framework it considered in analyzing the parents' 
wrongful birth action. tOt The court found a duty by medical providers 
to a child not yet born or conceived based upon the foreseeable 
harm that could come to the child if treatment is rendered negli-
gently.t02 The court identified the breach of duty as either the "failure 
to impart material information" or the "negligent performance of a 
procedure to prevent the birth of a defective child."t03 The court 
held those special damages proximately caused by the defendant 
readily ascertainable, t04 and rejected the sanctity of lifetos and prox-
imate causet06 arguments advanced in other cases. The court, however, 
denied the infants' claim for general damages on the grounds that 
those damages could not be proved with reasonable certainty. tOO 
In Procanik v. Cillo,tOS the Supreme Court of New Jersey revis-
ited its previous wrongful life decision in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, and 
held for the first time that a child could recover special damages for 
the treatment and habilitation costs associated with his handicaps. tOO 
100. [d. The court indicated that double recovery by both parents and child for the 
same extraordinary expenses would not be allowed. Thus, if the parents were 
awarded extraordinary damages pursuant to their wrongful birth action, the 
child could not recover the same damages in her wrongful life action for the 
period during which damages were awarded to the parents. [d.; see also infra 
note 121 (collecting cases where special damages have not been awarded to 
children for their care during adulthood because those same damages could be 
awarded as part of their parents' wrongful birth claims). 
101. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495. 
102. [d. at 495-96. 
103. [d. at 488. 
104. [d. at 496. 
105. [d. at 496-97 (citing Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12-13 (N.J. 1979». 
106. [d. at 497 (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967». 
107. [d. at 496. 
108. 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984). 
109. [d. at 762. Two issues were presented to the New Jersey Supreme Court on 
appeal: First, whether Peter Procanik in his own right could recover general 
and special damages arising from his birth with defects. [d. at 758. Second, 
whether Peter's parents were entitled to recover general damages for their 
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Peter Procanik and his parents sued three physicians for failing to 
diagnose his mother as having rubella during her first trimester of 
pregnancy, a fact that would have resulted in the parents' decision 
to terminate the pregnancy. 110 Peter was born suffering from con-
genital rubella syndrome and mUltiple birth defects associated with 
the disorder. III 
The majority opinion in Procanik relied on Justice Jacobs's 
dissenting opinion in Gleitman v. Cosgrovell2 and held the child 
entitled to those special damages which are "readily measurable."113 
The court, however, rejected the child's claim for general damages, 
noting that although "mathematical precision" is not required in 
calculating damages for personal injury, "some modicum of ration-
ality" is necessary}I4 To recognize the right of a child to recover 
general damages for being born, the majority noted, would present 
insurmountable problems for jurors who would struggle to deter-
mine the value of life and the morality of abortion, and who may 
be unable to disassociate their finding of injury and damage from 
the value and quality of their own lives. liS These difficulties, the 
court noted, would likely cause "wild swings" in general damage 
awards, and are "more than the justice system can digest. "116 
The majority in Procanik held, however, that the child could 
recover the special damages for the medical care and treatment 
emotional distress and special damages for the care and treatment of Peter's 
handicaps. [d. The court relied upon N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:I4-2 to find the 
parents' wrongful birth chums independent of Peter's wrongful life action and 
thus barred by the state's two year statute of limitations. 478 A.2d at 764. 
110. [d. at 758. The complaint alleged that the medical providers failed to properly 
interpret a blood test performed on Mrs. Procanik during the early stages of 
her pregnancy, which, if properly interpreted, would have indicated her infected 
condition. [d. The doctors, however, negligently interpreted the results as 
indicating Mrs. Procanik's past rubella infection rather than her ongoing 
infection with the disease. [d. 
111. [d. 
112. 227 A.2d 689, 703-06 (N.J. 1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). See supra notes 16-
28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Gleitman decision. 
113. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 761 (quoting Gieitman, 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting». 
114. [d. at 763. 
115. [d; see also Bernadette Kennedy, Comment, The Trend Toward Judicial Rec-
ognition oj Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 473, 489-
91 (1983) (persons asked to make the life/nonlife comparison will look only 
to their own fears and preconceptions about what it would be like to live with 
a particular handicap). 
116. Procanik, 227 A.2d at 763. But see id. at 766-70 (Handler, J., dissenting in 
part) (general damages for pain and suffering should be awarded to the child 
because she suffers a diminished childhood from her parents' inability to care 
for her). 
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occasioned by his handicaps,u7 Citing to the Supreme Court of 
California holding in Turpin v. Sortini,1l8 Justice Pollock eloquently 
pronounced the majority's reasoning for allowing special damages: 
Law is more than an exercise in logic, and logical analysis, 
although essential to a system of ordered justice, should 
not become a[n] instrument of injustice. Whatever logic 
inheres in permitting parents to recover for the cost of 
extraordinary medical care incurred by a birth-defective 
child, but in denying the child's own right to recover those 
expenses, must yield to the injustice of that result. The 
right to recover the often crushing burden of extraordinary 
expenses visited by an act of medical malpractice should 
not depend on the wholly "fortuitous circumstance of 
whether the parents are able to sue."119 
Awarding special damages to the child, the court concluded, "will 
carry a sufficient sting to deter future acts of medical malpractice" 
and is an appropriate response "to the call of the living for help 
in bearing the burden of their affliction." 120 
The foregoing cases illustrate the various approaches taken by 
courts that have addressed wrongful life and wrongful birth claims. 
Courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions refuse to award any 
damages to the child for her handicapped life, although some of 
these same courts in the same cases have awarded parents general 
damages for the suffering they must endure because of the child's 
handicapped life. In recent years, a few courts have awarded the 
child special damages for the special care required after her ma-
jority, while many more have awarded the parents these same 
117. [d. at 763. The Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of whether 
the child was entitled to special damages, even though such damages were not 
sought in his complaint. [d. at 761-62. The reason for the court's sua sponte 
consideration was the parents' inability to collect special damages because their 
claim was time-barred by the state's two year statute of limitations. [d. at 764. 
See also supra note 109. 
118. 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982). 
119. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762 (quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 
1982». The court also recognized that the economic impact of the child's need 
for extraordinary medical care is felt not only by the parents of that child, 
but also by the child's siblings who are deprived of the parents' financial 
support for education and other necessities. [d. at 762. Other courts have 
rejected wrongful birth claims initiated on behalf of siblings. See, e.g., Azzolino 
v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, .537 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 
(1986). See generally PRENATAL INJURIES AND WRONGFUL LIFE § 57, at 1:191-
92 (Law. Coop. 1993). 
120. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762. 
1993] Wrongful Life 205 
damages as a matter of course in their claims for wrongful birth.12I 
With this case law overview as a primer, Part Two of this Article 
undertakes a more detailed analysis of the wrongful life action 
against each of the five tort elements within the traditional tort 
framework. 
III. WRONGFUL LIFE AND THE TRADITIONAL TORT 
FRAMEWORK 
A. Establishment of a Duty to Parent and Unborn Child 
The wrongful life action, like other tort claims for Injuries 
inflicted prior to birth, raises difficult questions about the physician-
patient relationship and, more specifically, to whom a duty of prudent 
medical treatment is owed. At first blush, it appears somewhat 
anomalous that a medical provider should owe the unborn a duty to 
disclose medical information when she cannot act upon the infor-
mation. It is the parents and not the unborn who must make the 
ultimate decision whether or not to bring the child into the world, . 
and it is the parents, particularly the mother, who maintains control 
over decisions concerning abortion. 
In the context of wrongful life and wrongful birth actions, 
although it is the unborn's parents who seek prenatal treatment or 
genetic counseling, the ultimate concern throughout the treatment 
and decision-making processes is the well-being of the unborn. l22 For 
this reason, courts have found an independent duty running to the 
unborn to advise her parents of the risks that she will be born 
genetically impaired. This section examines more closely the inde-
pendent duty owed to the unborn child to disseminate information 
regarding her genetic fate which, although impossible for the child 
to act upon, is crucial to the state of her existence. 
1. Prenatal Tort: The Independent Legal Status of the Unborn 
Prenatal tort is a common law action brought by or on behalf 
of a child or a deceased for injuries sustained at some point during 
121. Some courts refuse to award special damages to children alleging wrongful life 
because their parents can recover those same damages for the duration of the 
children's lifetime as part of their wrongful birth claims. See, e.g., Kush v. 
Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423-24 (Fla. 1992) (special damage award to parents 
must be placed in trust for child's benefit); Blake v. Cruz, 698 ·P.2d 315, 321 
(Idaho 1984) (similar); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341,354 (N.H. 1986); Phillips 
v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1320 n.1O (D.S.C. 1983); James G. v. 
Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882 (W. Va. 1985). 
122. Ann M. Rhodes, Legal Aspects of Prenatal Diagnosis, 31 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 233, 234 (1988). 
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gestation. The defendant's conduct ~ither causes the child to be born 
with defects or causes the child's death before or shortly after birth. 123 
The first American decision to address the right of a child to 
recover for prenatal injuries sustained in utero was the 1884 Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court decision in Dietrich v. Northampton. 124 
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes dismissed a prenatal tort 
claim brought on behalf of a child who was injured during his fourth 
month of gestation. 12s The unborn's claim was barred, according to 
Justice Holmes, because the child "was a part of the mother at the 
time of the injury, [and] any damage to it which was not too remote 
to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her. ... "126 In dictum, 
Justice Holmes also questioned whether an unborn child "could be 
said to have become a person recognized by the law as capable of 
having locus standi in court, or being represented there by an 
administrator. " 127 
Several years later in the Irish case of Walker v. Great Northern 
Railway of Ireland,l28 the court denied a claim for prenatal injuries 
sustained by an unborn which caused his premature birth and inev-
itable death.129 Chief Justice O'Brien, writing for the majority, based 
his opinion on the lack of privity between the carrier responsible for 
the mother's transport and the child in the mother's womb.I3O The 
lack of such privity, the majority held, nullified any duty owed to 
123. It is important to distinguish prenatal tort actions, rooted in the common law, 
from wrongful death and survival actions, which in most states are of statutory 
origin. Some courts refuse to apply their wrongful death and survival statutes 
to situations involving the death of an unborn fetus, and justify their refusal 
by defining narrowly the meaning of "person" as used in their state's wrongful 
death statute. See Elizabeth F. Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal 
Torts, Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful 
Birth: Time For a New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 689 n.57 (1984); David 
Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. 
REv. 639, 652 nn. 68-70 (1980). Wrongful death and survival cases remain 
instructive on the common-law rights of the unborn, however, because inherent 
in the analysis of the statutory right of recovery is the question of whether the 
child could have pursued a common-law action for prenatal injury had she 
survived her injury. Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 
A.2d 394, 395 (D.C. App. 1984). 
124. 138 Mass. 14 (1884), overruled by Torigian v. Watertown News Co:, 225 
N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967). 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 17. Very few jurisdictions remain loyal to Justice Holmes's statement in 
Dietrich that an unborn child does not hold a status independent of its mother 
until it is born alive. See, e.g., Blackman v. Langford, 795 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 
1990); see also infra note 147. 
127. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 16. 
128. 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1890). 
129. [d. 
130. [d. at 79. 
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the unborn.13J In a concurring opinion, Associate Justice O'Brien 
opined that the more compelling reason for denying the child's claim 
was the impossibility of proving causation, and the danger of ficti-
tious and unwieldy claims. 132 
Both Dietrich and Walker exemplify the rationales used by early 
courts to deny' recovery for prenatal injuries because of the lack of 
duty owed to the unborn. Over the next several years, however, 
American tort law evidenced a slow but steady trend toward allowing 
recovery for injuries wrongfully committed against the unborn. 
One of the first judicial pronouncements favoring recognition 
of actions for prenatal tort was Justice Boggs dissenting opinion in 
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.133 Justice Boggs departed from the 
opinion by Justice Holmes in Dietrich, which held that because a 
child held no separate existence apart from her mother, the defendant 
could owe the child no duty to act prudently. 134 Instead, Justice 
Boggs reasoned that a child achieves independent legal status once 
she is capable of physical existence separate from her mother, and 
any injury sustained by the child after viability was compensable. m 
To Justice Boggs, it was clear that 
at a period of gestation in advance of the period of partu-
rition the foetus is capable of independent and separate life, 
and that, though within the body of the mother, it is not 
merely a· part of her body, for her body may die in all of 
its parts and the child remain alive, and capable of main-
taining life, when separated from the dead body of the 
mother .136 
It is upon this statement, and the heightened scientific understanding 
of the physical development of the fetus, that courts have relied in 
131. !d. American courts no longer require privity of contract as a prerequisite for 
recovery in negligence. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 
1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
132. [d. at 81 (O'Brien, J., concurring). "[T]here are instances in the law where 
rules of right are founded upon the inherent and inevitable difficulty or 
impossibility of proof. And it is easy to see on what a boundless sea of 
speculation in evidence this new idea would launch us." [d. 
133. 56 N.E. 638, 640 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting). Allaire involved a claim 
by a child, born alive, who sustained severe injuries in utero after his mother 
fell from a chair in an elevator operated by the defendant hospital. [d. at 638. 
In a per curiam opinion, the majority followed the reasoning of Justice Holmes 
in Dietrich and held the child was owed no independent duty since it had no 
separate existence at the moment of injury. [d. at 640. 
134. See Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884), overruled by Torigian 
v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967). 
135. Allaire, 56 N.E. at 641-42. 
136. [d. at 641. 
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developing the viability standard in prenatal tort actions.137 
In the first reported decision to allow recovery for tortious 
prenatal conduct, Kine v. Zuckerman,138 a Pennsylvania trial court 
avoided the issue of legal status of the fetus, and focused primarily 
on the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
unborn child's subsequent injury.139 The court rejected the defen-
dant's argument that, since the negligence occurred at a time prior 
to the legal existence of the child, the defendant could not be held 
liable. l40 Instead, the court held that "[t]he time which elapses 
between the negligent act which puts harmful forces in motion and 
the receipt of the injury by the person injured is of no consequence, 
except as it may have an evidential value in a dispute as to cause 
and effect." 141 The Kine decision expressed a view of unborn rights 
which soon gained acceptance in appellate decisions from other 
jurisdictions. 
2. The Viability Standard 
Twenty-two years after Kine, the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia decided Bonbrest v. Kotz,142 a case cited 
by many jurists as the seminal case allowing recovery for prenatal 
injuries. 143 In recognizing the child's independent right to damages, 
viability played a pivotal role in the court's decision. Writing for a 
unanimous court, Justice McGuire ~oted the "anomalous doctrine 
... announced by Mr. Justice Holmes in ... Dietrich,"I44 and 
reasoned that if the child is viable, it no longer is a part of the 
mother and should receive the same legal protections afforded any 
other living person: 145 
As to a viable child being "part" of its mother-this ar-
gument seems to me to be a contradiction in terms. True, 
it is in the womb, but it is capable now of extrauterine 
life-and while dependent for its continued development on 
137. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139-40 (D.D.C. 1946), discussed 
infra at notes 142-46 and accompanying text. See also infra note 147 (collecting 
cases applying the viability standard). 
138. 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924), overruled by, Berlin v. J.C. Penny Co., 16 A.2d 
28 (Pa. 1940). 
139. [d. at 230. 
140. [d. at 231. 
141. [d. at 230. 
142. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). 
143. See, e.g., Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort 
Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries 
and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1402, 1411. 
144. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139. 
145. [d. at 140-42. 
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sustenance derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, 
it is not "part" of the mother in the sense of a constituent 
element-as that term is generally understood. Modern med-
icine is replete with cases of living children being taken 
from dead mothers. Indeed, apart from viability, a non-
viable foetus is not a part of its mother .146 
209 
The Bonbrest court's willingness to go beyond existing precedent 
to attach liability to the physician's acts, and its refusal to succumb 
to the difficulties of proof and the possibility of· fraudulent claims, 
soon took hold in other jurisdictions. Many of the cases decided in 
the wake of Bonbrest adopted the viability standard for determining 
whether wrongful conduct was an actionable prenatal tort. 147 
3. Disregard for the Viability Standard: Conception and Beyond 
A fundamental deficiency in the viability approach, however, is 
that the most debilitating effects of maternal disease and trauma 
during pregnancy attach at the very early stages of fetal develop-
146. Id. at 140 (citations omitted). 
147. The following cases require that the child be viable at the time of injury as a 
prerequisite for recovery on the basis of prenatal tort, although not all require 
that the child be born alive: Estate of Baby Foy v. Morningstar Beach Resort, 
Inc., 635 F. Supp. 741 (D. V.I. 1986) (stillborn); Summerfield v. Superior 
Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985) (born alive); Scott v. McPheeters, 92 P.2d 
678 (Cal. Ct. App.) (born ative), a/I'd per curiam, 93 P.2d 562 (Cal. 1939); 
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956) 
(stillborn); Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394 
(D.C. App .. 1984) (born alive); Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1971) (stillborn); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983) 
(stillborn); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962) (stillborn); Rice v. Rizk, 
453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970) (stillborn); Milton v. Cary Med. Ctr., 538 A.2d 
252 (Me. 1988) (stillborn); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) 
(stillborn); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954) (stillborn); O'Grady v. 
Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en bane) (stillborn); White v. Yup, 458 
P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969) (stillborn); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (stillborn); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 
1987) (stillborn); Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1988) (stillborn); 
Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985) (stillborn); Libbee v. Perma-
nente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636 (Or. 1974) (stillborn); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 
365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976) (stillborn); Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 
1960) (born alive); Farley v. Mount Marty Hosp. Ass'n, 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 
1986) (stillborn); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Servo Inc., 358 S.W.2d 471 
(Tenn. 1962) (born alive); Vaillancourt V. Medical Ctr. Hosp., Inc., 425 A.2d 
92 (Vt. 1980) (stillborn); Moen V. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975) (still-
born); Baldwin V. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971) (stillborn); Kwaterski 
V. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967) (stillborn). 
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ment-well before the fetus is viable. l48 Today, a number of juris-
dictions have abandoned the viability test for determining whether a 
duty was owed at the time the tortious conduct was committed. 149 
a. Previability Tort 
As the number of claims brought for prenatal injuries increased, 
a minority of courts began to look beyond the viability requirement 
148. The shortcomings of the viability standard are appropriately described by Judge 
Haynsworth in his dissenting opinion in Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 
F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964) (interpreting South Carolina law): 
Treatment of viability at the time of injury as significant is a relic of 
a relatively modern misunderstanding. When Mr. Justice Holmes wrote 
for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1884, he advanced 
as one reason for not allowing recovery for prenatal injuries the 
notion that, until birth, the child was part of its mother. That notion 
was inconsistent with what common law precedents there were and 
with medical facts as they are known today. Its expression, however, 
led those taking the first hesitant steps away from Dietrich to say 
with understandable restraint that a viable child, at least, was not 
part of its mother. Since we now know that a child is no more a part 
of its mother before viability than after, this relic of an invalid notion 
does not deserve preservation. Our steps away from Dietrich need no 
longer be hesitant. 
Id. at 79 (Haynsworth, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
149. The following jurisdictions do not require that the child be viable at the time 
of injury in order to bring an action for prenatal tort, although the vast 
majority requires that the child be born alive: Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 
22 (8th Cir. 1978) (interpreting Missouri law); Brown v. Green, 767 F. Supp. 
273 (D.D.C. 1991); Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1973); Simon v. 
Mullin, 380 A.2d 1353 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe 
Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 
1250 (Ill. 1977); Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 1992); Group Health 
Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198 (Md. 1983); Torigian v. Watertown News 
Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967); Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 
(Mich. 1971); Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958); Smith v. Brennan, 
157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1953); Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992); Graham 
v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342 (Okla. 1993); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 
1960) (dictum); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966); Yandell v. 
Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971); Kalafut v. Gruver, 389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 
1990). 
Only one reported appellate decision has recognized a cause of action for 
the death of a nonviable fetus. See Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. 
App. 1955). Most courts have rejected this approach. See, e.g., Gentry v. 
Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1993); Rapp v. Hiemenz, 246 N.E.2d 77 (Ill. 
App. 1969); Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. App. 1975); Rambo v. 
Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990) (en banc); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 
134 (N.H. 1980); Egan v. Smith, 622 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio App. 1993); Coveleski 
v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1993); Miccolis v. AMICA Mut. Ins. Co., 587 
A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991). 
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and deemed actionable any wrongful conduct causing injury to the 
unborn at any point after conception. In Kelly v. Gregory,ISO for 
example, a New York intermediate appellate court held that upon 
the establishment of a causal connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury to the unborn, an action may be brought for 
injuries sustained at any point after the child's conception.1SI Today, 
a number of courts have abandoned the viability standard and allow 
recovery for injuries sustained by the unborn child during any stage 
of fetal development. ls2 
b. Preconception Tort 
Actions for preconception tort afford recovery for injuries caused 
by acts or omissions occurring prior to a child's conception. 1S3 
Relatively few preconception tort cases have been decided by appellate 
courts, and those cases take different approaches and reach different 
conclusions on the legitimacy of the action. 
The first preconception tort action was decided in 1973 by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Jorgensen 
v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc.1S4 That case involved claims 
brought on behalf of twins born severely retarded, allegedly as the 
result of their mother's ingestion of birth control pills prior to 
150. 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953). 
151. Id. at 698. Kelly involved an action by a minor child for injuries sustained 
during the third month of gestation as a result of an automobile collision. Id. 
at 697. The court held that a nonviable fetus was capable of sustaining physical 
injury notwithstanding his inability to live outside the mother's womb. Id. at 
697-98. 
152. See supra note 149. 
153. See Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978). The term "pre-
conception tort" is somewhat of a misnomer in the legal sense because, as a 
general rule, a tort is not complete until injury is suffered from the defendant's 
act or omission. Although it is true that the unborn's mother may be exposed 
to the defendant's negligent conduct, oftentimes the negligence does not cause 
her direct injury. See generally Charles L. Moore, Comment, Radiation and 
Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems in Tort Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 
414 (1974),. The tort, as it applies to the unconceived child, is not complete 
until that child is conceived and adversely affected. See Renslow v. Mennonite 
Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1259 (III. 1977) (Dooley, J., concurring). Without 
the child's conception, therefore, the defendant's conduct is nothing more than 
"negligence in the air." See id. at 1254 (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, TORTS 
361 (14th ed. 1939»; see also Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 
851 (Mo. 1993). 
Defendants in preconception cases often challenge preconception tort claims 
by arguing that no duty is owed to someone not in existence at the time of 
the wrongful conduct. This argument ignores the conditional prospective nature 
of the duty owed to potential life. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
154. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). 
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plaintiffs' conception. ISS The infants brought negligence, strict liabil-
ity, and warranty actions against Meade Johnson, alleging that the 
pharmaceutical it manufactured caused an alteration of their mother's 
chromosomal structure, which, in turn, caused their mongoloid con-
dition. ls6 In allowing the preconception tort action to proceed to 
trial, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma law recognized 
actions for prenatal injuries grounded on theories of strict liability, 
negligence, and breach of warranty-any of which might support the 
plaintiffs' claim. Although the case involved a defective pharmaceu-
tical and thus could have been decided on strict products liability 
grounds, Jorgensen provided the necessary groundwork for a later 
decision based solely on negligence. ls7 
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,ls8 a sharply divided Supreme 
Court of Illinois permitted recovery by a child for neurologic and 
hematologic injuries sustained as the result of negligent blood trans-
fusions administered to her mother more than seven years prior to 
the child's conception. 1S9 The Renslow majority, in recognizing pre-
conception tort as a valid cause of action, acknowledged the logical 
progression of American tort law to provide recompense to those 
injured during the very early stages of gestation. l60 The court could 
envision no reason why a child may recover for injury sustained 
prior to viability, but not for harms put in motion prior to the 
child's existence which manifest their ill effects only upon contact 
with the embryo at conception. 161 
155. Id. at 238. 
156. Id. 
157. Several courts and commentators argue that Jorgensen is of minimal significance 
in the development of preconception tort law because the action was governed 
by strict products liability law. See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 429 
N.E.2d 786, 788 n. ~ (N.Y. 1981); Comment, Preconception Injuries: Viable 
Extension oj Prenatal Injury Law or Inconceivable Tort?, 12 VAL. U. L. REv. 
143, 168 (1977). A careful reading of the court's brief holding, however, reveals 
that the case was not decided solely on the basis of strict products liability. 
See Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 241; see also "discussion infra notes 173-75 and 
accompanying text. 
158. 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977). 
159. Id. at 1255-56. In 1965, Emma Renslow was transfused with incompatible Rh-
positive blood that caused her own blood to sensitize. Id. at 1251. This condition 
went unnoticed for several years until the results of a routine blood test 
indicated her condition. Id. At the time her condition was detected, Emma 
was pregnant with her daughter Leah Ann, but at no time did treating physicians 
advise Emma of her condition or its possible consequences on the health of 
her expected child. Id. Leah Ann was born severely handicapped. Id. 
160. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois had not ruled on the legitimacy of the 
viability standard prior to Renslow, that case inherently presented the issue. 
Id. at 1253-54. . 
161. Id. at 1255. 
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The concept of foreseeability played a significant role in the 
Renslow decision. Justice Moran, writing for the majority in Ren-
slow, found it both logical and justified to extend a physician's duty 
to those persons who are the foreseeable beneficiaries of her treatment 
or advice, whether or not they are in being at the time the treatment 
or advice is rendered. 162 The majority declined to follow the existing 
line of cases which had imposed preconception tort liability on the 
basis of causation,163 noting that "in a very real sense the conse-
quences of an act go forward to eternity, and back to the beginning 
of the world."I64 Thus, Justice Moran concluded that "any attempt 
to impose responsibility on such a basis would result in infinite 
liability for all wrongful acts, which 'set society on edge and fill the 
courts with endless litigation."'16s 
The Renslow majority recognized that harmful conduct and the 
resulting injury need not occur simultaneously-that a tortfeasor may 
set harm.ful forces in motion at a time when the inevitable victim 
does not exist, and remain conditionally and prospectively liable to 
those whose situation in time and place make them the unfortunate 
beneficiaries of the harm.l66 It is this concept of conditional pro-
spective liability that is basic to the wrongful life action, which 
charges that a genetic counselor is negligent in failing to disclose 
genetic risks at a time when the victim is either unborn or uncon-
ceived. Although the advice when disseminated is only potentially 
injurious, it is not harmful and therefore tortious until the child is 
conceived and born alive. 
The rationale of the majority opinion in Renslow has been 
questioned by several courts that have refused to recognize the 
preconception tort action. In Albala v. City of New York,167 Jeffrey 
162. [d. 
163. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (lOth Cir. 
1973). 
164. Rens/ow, 367 N.E.2d at 1254. 
165. [d. (quoting William L. Prosser, Po/sgroi Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 24 
(1953». . 
166. [d. at 1255. Accord Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. 1992) (holding 
physician and laboratory liable for failing to diagnose and treat mother's Rh 
blood disorder prior to conception of twins who were born with severe birth 
defects as a result); Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851 
(Mo. 1993) (similar); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342 (Okla. 1993) (similar); 
see a/so Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying Missouri 
law) (physician who negligently performed Caesarean section on mother prior 
to plaintiff's conception liable for injuries sustained by child born prematurely 
as a result); Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) 
(physician breached duty to unconceived child by failing to immunize her 
mother against rubella where physician was aware of mother's intention to 
conceive a child). 
167. 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981). 
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Albala brought suit against Bellevue Hospital alleging that a negli-
gently performed abortion procedure on his mother seven years prior 
to his birth caused him to sustain severe brain damage upon his 
conception. 168 In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the ma-
jority held that to recognize a right of action for preconception tort 
"would require the extension of traditional tort concepts beyond 
manageable bounds . . . ." 169 The court reasoned that the duty owed 
to the unconceived must not be based solely on foreseeability; oth-
erwise the class of potential plaintiffs would grow at a staggering 
and unmanageable rate. 170 The court also noted the consequence of 
recognizing preconception tort on the medical community, the mem-
bers of which would be tempted to practice defensive medicine to 
avoid potential malpractice, and on "society as a whole[, which] 
would bear the cost of our placing physicians in a direct conflict 
between their moral duty to patients and the proposed legal duty to 
those hypothetical future generations outside the immediate zone of 
danger."171 
In a footnote, the majority acknowledged the handful of cases 
in other jurisdictions which had recognized preconception tort, but 
noted that two of the three cases were "based largely on a misplaced 
reliance upon precedent in prenatal injury cases .... "172 In discuss-
ing the third case, Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 173 
however, the court noted that foreseeability played no part in that 
decision because it was a products liability action based on strict 
liability, where "the necessity of establishing manageable bounds for 
168. [d. at 787. 
169. [d. 
170. The notion that liability must stop somewhere has served to defeat preconcep-
tion tort claims in several other cases decided subsequent to Albala. See Hegyes 
v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (driver of 
automobile who. caused collision not liable for premature birth of child not 
conceived when accident occurred); McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258, 260 
(Ga. 1983) (similar); McNulty v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 906-07 (Mass. 
1993) (ob-gyn owed no duty to unconceived child to vaccinate her mother 
against rubella where purpose of medical consultation was to prevent mother's 
pregnancy); Carr v. Wittingen, 451 N.W.2d 584, 585-86 (Mich. App. 1990) 
(physician who negligently performed laparotomy on mother prior to child's 
conception not liable for death of unborn child after mother's uterus ruptured 
during pregnancy); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991) 
(pharmaceutical manufacturer not liable for injuries sustained by granddaughter 
of woman who ingested diethylstilbestrol (DES) during her pregnancy); Grover 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700-01 (Ohio 1992) (same). 
171. Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 788-89. 
172. [d. at 788 n.· (citing Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) and 
Renslow v. Mennonite Hasp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977». 
173. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). 
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liability is conspicuously absent. "174 Cases premised on strict products 
liability, the court concluded, do not necessitate a circumscribed view . 
of foreseeability because a manufacturer's liability a~tomatically ex-
tends to the entire class of persons affected by the product regardless 
of foreseeability or due care. m 
The foregoing cases evidence the progression of American tort 
law which, today, fully embraces the concept of duty owed to the 
unborn. This expanded notion of duty is important in wrongful life 
cases because the medical provider's independent duty now extends 
to the unborn or unconceived child to disseminate accurate infor-
mation to those who have control over her genetic fate. 176 Although 
the unborn child cannot act on the information, the quality of her 
life is so inextricably dependent on this information that a breach of 
care by a medical provider is a breach of her obligation to the 
unborn or unconceived child. 
B. Breach of Duty: The Evolution of Genetics and the Standard 
of Care for Genetic Counselors 
The study of inheritance and human genetics has developed at 
an incessant pace since Gregor Mendel discovered that hereditary 
traits are passed on to offspring in hereditary units known as 
"genes."177 Almost 100 years later, in 1953, James Watson and 
174. Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 788 n.·. It is not at all clear from the holding in 
Jorgensen that the case was decided on the basis of strict products liability. In 
fact, the Tenth Circuit, in concluding that Oklahoma law provided the foun-
dation upon which an action for preconception tort could be based, focused 
on concepts of duty, causation, and proximate cause, and noted that "principles 
of strict liability in tort, negligence and warranty have been primarily recognized 
by court decision, even though substantially new bases of recovery were 
afforded." Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 241. The court, however, never actually 
stated the theory upon which it relied in reaching its decision. 
175. Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 788 n.·. The insignificance of foreseeability in strict 
liability does not justify the conclusion reached in Albala that "the necessity 
of manageable bounds for liability is conspicuously absent." [d. To the 
contrary, if the true concern is establishing manageable bounds for' liability, 
negligence rather than strict liability better deters ultimate recovery. Plaintiffs 
alleging negligence, particularly in defective product cases, have the difficult 
burden of proving fault. Strict tort liability, at least in theory, however, relieves 
the plaintiff of this burden, and requires only that she prove the product was 
defective when it left the manufacturer's control. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); DAVID FISHER & Wll.LIAM POWERS, JR., 
PRODUCTS LIABll.ITY 50-51 (1988). But see infra note 317 and accompanying 
text (culpability remains an element of strict products liability). 
176. But see James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 880-81 (W. Va. 1985) (holding 
that no duty is owed to unborn infant suing for wrongful life). 
177. Gregor Mendel, Experiments in Plant Hybridization, in CLASSIC PAI'ERS IN 
GENETICS 1 (J. Peters ed., 1959). 
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Francis Crick discovered the double helix structure of DNA (deoxy-
ribonucleic acid),178 and a new science, molecular biology, introduced 
new techniques such as amniocentesis,179 chorionic villus sampling, 180 
and alpha-fetoprotein analysisl81 for identifying various congenital 
anomalies in unborn children. 
Genetic testing and evaluation affords parents the opportunity 
to make a timely and informed choice whether or not to conceive 
178. James Watson & Francis Crick, Genetical Implications of the Structure of 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, 17l NATURE 964 (1953). 
179. Amniocentesis is the most commonly utilized invasive prenatal procedure, and 
is used extensively to detect numerous genetic abnormalities through DNA 
analysis. A long surgical needle is inserted into the woman's amniotic sack 
where a small amount of fluid is removed. The procedure is medically indicated 
where the mother is of advanced maternal age (over 35), where there is a 
known familial translocation, or where there is a prior birth of a child with 
trisomy 21. John W. Littlefield et aI., Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis: Status & 
Problems, in ETIDCAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS, supra note 52, at 43. "At 
a maternal age of 35 years the risk of a chromosome abnormality is 1 per 200 
live births and increases to 1 per 65 live births by age 40 years." ROBERT W. 
KISTNER, GYNECOLOGY 658-59 (4th ed. 1986). But cj. M.M. Adams et aI., 
Down's Syndrome: Recent Trends in the United States, 246 JAMA 758 (1981) 
(reporting that the incidence of Down's syndrome among women over age 45 
is less than 35 per 1000 live births). 
180. Chorionic villus sampling (CVS) is a relatively new technology for diagnosing 
various chromosomal abnormalities during fetal gestation. ROVINSKY & GUTT-
MACHER'S MEDICAL, SURGICAL & GYNECOLOGIC COMPLICATIONS OF PREGNANCY 
310 (Carol-Lynn Brown ed., 1985) [hereinafter ROVINSKY & GUTTMACHER]. A 
small catheter is inserted through the vagina and cervix to extract a small 
sample of chorionic tissue from the fetal placenta for chromosomal and 
biochemical analyses. Id. The procedure can be used as early as nine weeks 
into pregnancy and, in most instances, is preferable to amniocentesis, which 
cannot be performed before the sixteenth week and requires two-to-three weeks 
additional time to culture the fetal cells. Id. CVS is not appropriate in all 
circumstances; amniocentesis is still required for the detection of certain genetic 
disorders such as neural tube defects. Id. at 306. Where CVS is feasible, 
however, the patient is afforded the opportunity to make prompt decisions 
about first trimester abortion, and physicians are afforded the opportunity to 
initiate fetal therapy at a very early stage of the child's prenatal development. 
Frank A. Chervenak et al., Advances in the Diagnosis of Fetal Defects, 315 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 305, 306 (1986). . 
181. Alpha-fetoprotein (AFP) can be measured in maternal serum (through a blood 
test on the mother) or in the amniotic fluid (through amniocentesis). Maternal 
serum AFP analysis is a screening test elevated levels of AFP which may be 
associated with open neural tube defects. Conversly, low levels AFP may be 
associated with trisomies such as Down's syndrome. KENNETH L. GARVER & 
SANDRA G. MARCHESE, GENETIC COUNSELING FOR CLINICIANS 73 (1986); see 
also infra note 246 (offering a medical description of neural tube defects). 
Amniocentesis can then be performed to confirm or rule out these anomalies. 
GARVER, supra at 73. Timing is critical to accurate test results. JACK A. 
PRITCHARD ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 277 (17th ed. 1985). AFP analysis 
should be performed between 16 and 20 weeks of gestation. [d. 
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or to proceed with a pregnancy. When the genetic counselor, testing 
laboratory, or other medical provider fails accurately to disseminate 
genetic information to prospective parents, litigation in the form of 
wrongful life and wrongful birth actions sometimes ensues. This 
section examines the roles, duties, and obligations of the genetic 
counselor as an information provider and advice giver. 
1. Genetic Counseling and the Role of the Counselor 
Clinical genetics or "genetic counseling" is a relatively new 
specialty, the availability and benefit of which has only recently been 
recognized by physicians, patients, and insurers in the prevention of 
hereditary and congenital birth defects.ls2 Genetic counseling involves 
the dissemination of information and advice by trained medical 
providers to potential parents regarding "the occurrence and risk of 
recurrence of certain genetic disorders."ls3 Genetic counseling typi-
cally involves the taking of a detailed medical history which may 
include a review of family pedigree, medical records, a physical 
examination, and either the performance· of, or instruction to un-
dergo, diagnostic procedures and laboratory analyses, all of which 
will determine with reasonable certainty the risks of passing genetic 
disease onto future offspring. l84 
Proper genetic counseling requires not only that the information 
be fully disclosed, but also that it be conveyed in such a manner as 
to maximize the parents' understanding of the diagnosis, thus allow-
ing them to make rational and informed decisions about the preg-
nancy. The genetic counselor hopes that the information derived 
from her evaluation can be conveyed accurately to the patient, and 
that the patient will fully understand the risks associated with the 
pregnancy. It is. not unusual, however, for the patient to become 
confused or feel overwhelmed by the complexity of the information. ISS 
Even the way a counselor portrays the disease may have a profound 
impact on the parents' ultimate decision to proceed with or to 
terminate a pregnancy.IS6 
182. Reed E. Pyeritz et al., The Economics oj Clinical Genetics Services L· Preview, 
41 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 549, 551 (1987). Clinical genetics began in the 194Os. 
[d. Since that time a few centers, such as the Medical Genetics Clinic at Johns 
Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, have been established. [d. However, the 
specialty as a whole has not had time to establish itself in mainstream medicine. 
[d. This is probably due to the fact that physicians, patients, and insurers are 
not yet fully aware of the genetic services available. [d. 
183. ROVINSKY & GUTTMACHER, supra note 180, at 307. 
184. [d. at 307-08. 
185. LORI B. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A NEW FRONTIER 108-110 (1987). 
186. Daniel Callahan, The Meaning and Significance oj Genetic Disease: Philo-
sophical Perspectives, in EnncAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS, supra note 52, 
at 83, 91; ANDREWS, supra note 185, at 109. 
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The qualifications of the professionals who render genetic coun-
seling vary considerably. Some physicians or Ph.Ds. specialize in 
genetics, while others incorporate genetic counseling into their obJ 
stetric or gynecologic practices.18? Other nonphysicians have special 
training in genetic counseling and consult patients pursuant to the 
recommendation of the patient's family physician. 188 
2. The Undefined Standard of Care for Genetic Counselors 
The extent of the genetic counselor's duty, and the standard of 
care against which the counselor is to be judged, are not fully defined, 
primarily because of the recent emergence of the field of genetic 
counseling as a separate medical specialty, the diversity of medical 
providers offering genetic counseling, and the rapid technological 
advancement that shapes diagnostic abilities. 189 As the field of genetic 
counseling is further refined by science and litigation, questions are 
surfacing as to the techniques and manner in which genetic infor-
mation is conveyed to patients. The problem is particularly acute in 
those circumstances where information known by the counselor is 
not properly conveyed to the patient, and thus, does not take on the 
significance it should in the parents' procreative decision-making 
process. 
A breach of duty by the genetic counselor in its simplest form 
occurs when the counselor fails to utilize diagnostic procedures, 190 
fails to take a family history l91 or inquire into the parents' ethnicity, 192 
187. Obstetricians may have a legal duty to refer at-risk patients to genetic coun-
selors. Keith S. Fineberg & J. Douglas Peters, Genetic Counseling and Screen-
ing: Standards of Care, Customary Practice, and Legal Liability, in PERSONAL 
INJURY DESKBOOK-1985 173, 175 (Barry Denkensohn & Gordon Ohlsson eds., 
1985); see also infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
188. Ricki Lewis, Better Babies, HEALTH, Mar. 1987, at 23-24. 
189. Further growth of genetic counseling as a separate medical discipline will 
inevitably give rise to a standard of care for the field. At present, however, it 
is difficult to find unanimous opinion among experts on the proper standard 
of care for genetic counseling. See, e.g., Alexander M. Capron, Tort Liability 
in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 622-25 (1979) (because of the 
wide variety of medical providers involved in genetic counseling, one profes-
sional standard cannot govern without the creation of a new medical discipline). 
Some commentators suggest that a national standard of care applies to genetic 
counseling. E.g., Roger Dworkin, The New Genetics, in BIOLAW 89 (James F. 
Childress et al. eds., 1986). 
190. Failure to offer amniocentesis is one of the most prevalent omissions giving 
rise to wrongful life and wrongful birth suits. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 
A.2d 8, 10 (N.J. 1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807,808 (N.Y. 1978). 
191. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1982); Siemieniec v. Lutheran 
Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Ill. 1987); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 
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or fails properly to interpret or disseminate genetic information.193 
Likewise, the provider may be negligent in failing to refer patients 
to specialists in genetics,l94 or in selecting an incompetent laboratory 
to administer a diagnostic procedure. 195 In these circumstances-which 
account for the vast majority of wrongful life and wrongful birth 
cases-the breach is easy to identify and, thus, liability would appear 
clear. In some circumstances, however, a breach of duty by a genetic 
counselor is not so easy to identify because at first blush the patient 
appears to have exercised an independent and informed procreative 
choice. Closer scrutiny, however, may reveal subtle deviations in the 
counseling approach which may have caused the parents to make a 
decision they otherwise would not have made had they been counseled 
differently.l96 In these cases, it will be more difficult to prove a 
834, 835 (N.J. 1981); Park v. Chessin, 440 N.Y.S.2d 110, (N.Y. App. Div. 
1977), modified sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
192. Certain genetic traits are more common in particular racial and ethnic groups. 
Sickle-cell anemia is most prevalent in Blacks, Tay-Sachs disease in eastern 
European Jews, cystic fibrosis in northern European Caucasians, and the 
various forms of thalassemia in Italians, Greeks, and other persons of Medi-
terranean ancestry. NELSON, supra note 10, at 284. 
193. See ANDREWS, supra note 185, at 105-06. 
194. Fineberg & Peters, supra note 187, at 173, 174. The following indications 
warrant referral to a genetic counselor: 
-a genetic or congenital anomaly in a family member; 
-family history of an inherited disorder; 
-abnormal somatic or behavioral development in a child; 
-mental retardation of unknown etiology in a child; 
-pregnancy in a woman older than age 35; 
-specific ethnic background suggestive of a high rate of genetic 
abnormality; 
-drug use or long-term exposure to possible teratogens or mutagen; 
-three or more spontaneous abortions, early infant deaths, or both; 
and 
-infertility. 
[d. at 174 (citing Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical 
Association, Genetic Counseling and Prevention oj Birth Dejects, 248 JAMA 
221 (1982». 
195. Commentators are split on the question of whether a genetic counselor should 
be accountable for laboratory errors. Compare Aubrey Milunsky, Prenatal 
Diagnosis and the Law, in GENETICS AND THE LAW II 61, 65 (Aubrey Milunsky 
& George Annas eds., 1980) (genetic counselors should be held accountable 
for negligently selecting a laboratory) with Phillip Reilly, Genetic Counseling 
and the Law, 12 Hous. L. REv. 640, 656 (1975) (genetic counselors should not 
be liable for tests negligently performed by an independent laboratory). 
196. There are two genetic counseling approaches. One involves "directive" coun-
seling, where advice or recommendations are made on the basis of test data 
in combination with the patient's perceived ability to act responsibly and cope 
with the decision she makes. The counselor practicing directive genetic coun-
seling may choose not to disclose certain information or she may suggest what 
she considers the "most appropriate" course of action for the patient under 
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breach of duty, particularly since the standard of care for genetic 
counseling is presently undefined. 197 
c. Proof of Causation 
As with any other negligence action, the wrongful life plaintiff 
must prove the defendant's negligence was the cause in fact and legal 
cause of her injury. Seldom has the lack of causation played a 
decisive role in appellate decisions denying wrongful life. 198 One 
reason is because the defendant usually challenges the action by 
motion for summary judgement or motion to dismiss, in which case 
the court must assume every allegation in the plaintiff's complaint 
is true. The plaintiff will usually plead the required allegations in 
her complaint. Whether she can actually prove causation along with 
the other elements of the action, however, depends on her success 
on the merits. 
the circumstances. The counselor may well justify nondisclosure of certain 
diagnoses on the assumption that the parents, upon receipt of such information, 
may decide "unreasonably" to abort the fetus. Alexander M. Capron, In-
formed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to the "Wrongful 
Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 588-94 (1973). Directive counseling is most 
frequently recommended when the patient is perceived not to understand the 
genetic information she receives, or when she chooses to forego medically 
indicated diagnostic procedures. Maxine A. Sonnenberg, Comment, A Prefer-
ence for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Mal-
practice, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 498-99 (1982). 
Other counselors practice "nondirective" counseling, where the counselor 
disseminates information on the risks of particular diagnostic procedures, the 
meaning of test results, the likelihood of disease manifestation, and the 
procreative alternatives; but the counselor renders no specific recommendation 
on the "most appropriate" course of action for the patient. The nondirective 
counseling approach appears the more preferable method for both the counselor 
and the patient since it leaves the ultimate decision concerning reproductive 
choice to the parents untaintc;d by the counselor's own moral, ethical, and 
religious convictions. ROVINSKY & GUTTMACHER, supra note, 180, at 308. 
Nondirective counseling also serves to reduce the counselor's exposure to 
malpractice liability because the rfatient has made a knowing and voluntary 
choice, assuming the information is communicated properly. A counselor who 
takes a purely nondirective approach must remain uninvolved in the parents' 
decision to terminate a pregnancy based on minimally significant conditions 
such as a cleft lip or even because of the undesirable sex of the child. The 
counselor must also remain uninvolved when the medical indications of the 
disease at issue are severe, yet the parents decide nonetheless to proceed with 
the pregnancy. It is not difficult to envision where a genetic counselor's personal 
interests and values may affect the counseling approach she employs. See 
Capron, supra, at 589-91. 
197. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
198. But see Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 893 (1988) (rejecting wrongful life claim on basis that impaired child 
cannot prove causation). 
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Causation in fact requires that the defendant's conduct be in-
extricably linked to the plaintiff's harm in such a way as to permit 
a trier of fact to conclude that, but for the defendant's conduct, the 
plaintiff would not have been injured. Thus, the child alleging 
wrongful life must prove she would not have been born but for the 
medical provider's failure to inform her parents of the genetic risks 
associated with her birth. 
Legal causation is often defined by the defendant's ability to 
foresee the adverse effects of her act or omission. l99 Thus, the extent 
of foreseeability will vary depending upon the status of the parties 
and their relationship with one another. Cases addressing the duty 
owed to unborn children establish that the unborn child, although 
not in existence or a person under the law, is a foreseeable beneficiary 
of the defendant's wrongful conduct. Likewise, where a woman of 
childbearing age seeks genetic counseling, it is reasonable for the 
genetic counselor to recognize the information she imparts will in-
evitably affect potential life. For these reasons, a genetic counselor 
who negligently withholds or discloses erroneous genetic information 
proximately causes the resulting child's handicapped condition since 
dissemination of accurate information would have allowed the parents 
to avoid the birth. Although the provider does not cause the im-
pairment in the literal sense, she causes the birth of a child with 
impairment and, thus, unilaterally transforms that impairment into 
absolute reality for both parent and child.200 
The vitality of the wrongful life action hinges on the freedom 
to make procreative decisions about conception and abortion. With-
out such freedom the parents cannot claim they were deprived of 
the "right" to avoid the birth of their child, and the wrongful life 
plaintiff will be unable to sustain her burden of proving factual 
causation. American jurisprudence embraces the parents' fundamen-
199. Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., 1 All E.R. 404 
(P.C. 1961); see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) 
(the zone of danger defines the zone of duty). 
200. E.g., Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993) (wrongful birth case). 
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965), an actor's negligent 
conduct is a legal cause if it is "a substantial factor'.' and if no rule 
of law relieves the actor from liability because of the manner in which 
the negligence resulted in harm. Even though the physical forces 
producing [the child's] birth defects were already in operation at the 
time of the alleged negligence of the physicians, under the chain of 
causation alleged by the [plaintiffs] the physicians could have prevented 
the harm to the parents. Those allegations, if proved, would present 
sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could find that the 
alleged negligence of the physicians was a substantial factor in the 
legal harm to the parents. 
[d. at 1152. 
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tal right to practice birth control and the woman's right to procure 
an abortion, although the latter right is not absolute at all phases of 
the pregnancy. 201 As long as procreative decision-making remains 
constitutionally protected, genetic counselors have a duty to inform 
their patients of these options as part of the counseling process. A 
breach of this duty can be said to proximately cause the birth of a 
handicapped child. 
The parents' personal decision whether· or not to exercise the 
rights afforded them under the law is also an issue of causation in 
the wrongful life action. The child must prove that, if properly 
informed, her parents would have acted upon the information dis-
closed by the genetic counselor and avoided the child's birth. The 
religious and moral convictions of the child's parents may be such 
that the child cannot prove her parents would have avoided her birth 
if given the chance.202 Thus, the medical provider's failure to properly 
disseminate genetic information is not the proximate cause of the 
child's impaired existence since her parents would not have heeded 
the information if given the opportunity. 203 
D. Birth as an Injury: The Metaphysical Conundrum 
The related issues of injury and damage in the wrongful life 
action have proved the major stumbling blocks for courts asked to 
decide whether the child has been harmed by being born.204 It is by 
now understood that the typical tort law approach for determining 
injury and damage is more problematic in wrongful life cases because 
the otherwise condition preferred by the plaintiff is nonexistence. 
This section examines the rationales underlying the refusal to award 
general and special damages to children alleging wrongful life, and 
analyzes the philosophical debate inherent in the concept that life 
201. Although the continued vitality of the trimester approach of Roe v. Wade has 
been challenged as unsound, see Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv5., 492 
U.S. 490, 529-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring), abortion remains part of 
the woman's right to privacy, at least for the immediate future. See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
202. For a general discussion of the various religious views on contraception and 
abortion, see James F. Childress, Religious and Philosophical Perspectives on 
Contraception and Abortion, in BIOLAW, supra note 189, at 69-71. 
203. The inability of the wrongful life plaintiff to prove that her parents would 
have procured an abortion because of their moral or religious convictions will 
rarely serve to defeat a wrongful life claim, particularly since the parents are 
usually the ones who initiate the action on behalf of their child. 
204. Injury and damages are treated herein as separate elements of the wrongful 
life action. See infra Part III.D.2. Other commentators refute the distinction 
between these related tort concepts. See, e.g., Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful 
Position in "Wrongful Life" Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 517, 525-35 
(1991). 
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with impairment is a cognizable injury when the child's otherwise 
condition is nonexistence. 
Reported wrongful life cases evidence a uniform unwillingness 
as a matter of law to permit recovery of general damages by a child 
born into a life with handicap-a life which could have been avoided 
but for the negligence of medical providers.205 Even the few courts 
that have awarded special damages for wrongful life have denied 
(rather inconsistently) the child's claim for general damages because 
of the absence of injury. 206 
Courts have justified their refusal to award general damages on 
various grounds, ranging from the purported inability to prove any 
damage in being born,207 to the danger that the sanctity of life will 
somehow be disavowed if courts were to allow such a right of 
recovery.208 Although the reasoning of those courts is well-inten-
tioned, their approach in refusing to recognize an impaired life as 
an injury is inconsistent with existing legal doctrine. 
1. Right-to-Die: An Appropriate Analogy 
Right-to-die cases evidence some concession by courts that life 
may not always be preferable to nonexistence, and are also instructive 
on the concept of substituted decision-making which is essential to 
the wrongful life action.209 Particularly instructive are those right-to-
die cases involving requests to discontinue or withhold artificial life 
support made on behalf of incompetent patients who have never 
205. See supra notes 7 and 9. 
206. If, as this Article posits, separate inquiries into injury and damages are required, 
it appears that injury must exist whenever any damages are awarded. See David 
H. Pace, Treatment of Injury in Wrongful Life Claims, 20 COLUM. J.L. & 
Soc. PROBS. 145, 155-58 (1986), reprinted in PERSONAL INJURY REVIEW-1987 
552, 563-66 (Barry Denkensohn & Agnes A. Fliss eds., 1987); see also infra 
note 259 and accompanying text. 
207. See Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1210-11 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); 
Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341,352 (N.H. 1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 
807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532-33 (N.C. 
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S: 835 (1986); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 
925 (Tex. 1984). 
208. See Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran 
Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 702 (Ill. 1987); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 
635, 642 (Kan. 1986); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 352-53 (N.H. 1986); 
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12-13 (N.J. 1979). But see Turpin v. Sortini, 
643 P.2d 954,961-62 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (suggesting that in cases of severe 
hereditary disease, never having been born may be preferable to being born). 
209. A detailed discussion of the right-to-die controversy is beyond the scope of 
this Article. For a further discussion of the many issues surrounding the right-
to-die, see generally ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1989); Nancy K. Rhoden, 
Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375 (1988). 
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been capable of expressing a preference for a particular course of 
treatment and who have never experienced healthy life. 
The substituted judgement doctrine is a judicially created legal 
fiction that affords an otherwise incompetent patient, through a 
proxy, the same rights as a competent patient to refuse extraordinary 
medical treatment that would merely prolong the patient's dying. 
Accordingly, courts and legislatures have developed various progno-
sis-based approaches for determining when it is appropriate to permit 
the removal and withholding of artificial life support. Those condi-
tions which would justify the removal of life support have been 
invariably described to include a patient who is terminally ill, irre-
versibly comatose, or who is in a persistent vegetative state. According 
to this doctrine, consideration must be given to what the patient, if 
competent, would have decided regarding her treatment. 
In In re Quinlan,210 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that 
the individual's right to privacy overrides the state's interest in 
preserving life in certain circumstances, so that the parents could 
make the life or death decision for a child incompetent to do so on 
her own.211 According to the holding in Quinlan, when reliable proof 
indicates that the patient has no chance of returning to a cognitive, 
sapient existence, a proxy, who, in Quinlan, was the patient's father, 
can choose to have treatment termiJlated.212 The court recognized 
that "the focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the 
reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as 
distinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegeta-
tive existence to which Karen seems to be doomed. "213 
The Quinlan court espoused what has come to be known as the 
"substituted judgment doctrine," which preserves the incompetent's 
rights by permitting a guardian or family member "to render their 
best judgement ... as to whether she would exercise it in these 
circumstances. "214 In pronouncing this ~andard, the court incorpo-
rated the expected preference of the incompetent patient: 
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, 
that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval 
(not altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which 
she would soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible 
condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance 
210. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 
U.S. 922 (1976). 
211. [d. at 663-64. 
212. [d. at 664. 
213. [d. at 669. 
214. [d. at 664. 
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of life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of 
natural death. 21s 
225 
The court continued by announcing that an incompetent patient has 
the same privacy rights as one who is fully competent, and in order 
to preserve those rights, a proxy can exercise the incompetent's rights 
for her: . 
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-
cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces 
is regarded as a valuable incident of her right to privacy, 
as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely 
on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious ex-
ercise of the choice. The only practical way to prevent 
destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family 
of Karen to render their best judgment, subject to the 
qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she would 
exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is in 
the affirmative this decision should be accepted by a society, 
the overwhelming majority of whose members would, we 
think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in the 
same way for themselves or for those closest to them. 216 
The substituted judgment approach as expressed in Quinlan 
embraces both the anticipated, subjective preference of the patient, 
and the objective, societal view of what is in the patient's best 
interest. The fact that Karen Quinlan was at one time competent and 
had previously intimated her desire not to be kept alive artificially 
made it easier for the court and her family to anticipate her pref-
erence. Nonetheless, Karen's best interest remained an important 
factor in the court's decision to permit removal of her life support. 
The significance of Quinlan'S substituted judgement approach to 
the wrongful life action lies in the inherent notion that action upon 
the patient's unexpressed but probable desire to forego life sustaining 
treatment is, in essence, promoting a patient's right to choose, even 
when the patient can not do so expressly. Equally significant is the 
concept that life can be of such a minimal quality that a court may 
conclude that one might prefer death or nonexistence to life. 
A few state courts have addressed the substituted judgment 
doctrine in situations where parents seek to withhold life-saving 
treatment from their seriously ill newborn.217 These cases are partic-
215. Id. at 663. 
216. Id. at 664. 
217. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991) (upholding parents' 
decision on religious grounds to forego treatment of child's terminal cancer); 
In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
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ularly instructive to the wrongful life analysis because the childo has 
never experienced healthy life and knows her life only as it is. 
In In re Guardianship oj Barry,218 the parents of a ten-month-
old infant petitioned the court for authorization to remove the 
ventilator life support that had kept their son, Andrew, alive since 
birth.219 Andrew was born afflicted with a severe and irreversible 
brain malformation that rendered his brain ninety percent dysfunc-
tional.220 Consequently, Andrew had no independent respiratory func-
tion and was placed on ventilator life support without which he 
would likely have died within a few hours.221 Andrew's parents were 
advised by treating physicians as to his medical condition, and were 
counseled by clergy who concurred with the morality of their decision 
to have Andrew's life support removed. ill Andrew's attending phy-
sicians and his court-appointed guardian ad litem also supported the 
parents' decision to terminate and withhold further life support. 223 
The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed the order au-, 
thorizing the termination of the ventilator life support and the 
withholding of further life-sustaining procedures.224 The court allowed 
the parents to exercise their substituted judgment, supplemented by 
competent medical evidence, to remove the life support even in the 
absence of evidence of Andrew's preference.22S The court acknowl-
edged the limits of the substituted judgment, doctrine, particularly 
where the patient never independently expressed her preference. 226 
Yet the court found it "the right and obligation of the parents in 
(granting parents' petition to remove terminally ill child from life support); see 
also In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984) (applying a "best interests" 
analysis in authorizing parents to remove terminally ill child from life support). 
Several other courts have applied a substituted judgment or best interests 
analysis in allowing "Do Not Resuscitate" orders to be entered on a terminally 
ill child's medical records. In re c.A., 603 N .E.2d 1171 (III. App. Ct. 1992), 
cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d 1264 (III. 1993); Care & Protection of Beth, 587 
N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1992); Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d 601 (Mass. 1982). 
Some argue that the substituted judgement approach is inappropriate in cir-
cumstances involving never-competent patients because "it is naive to pretend 
that the right to self-determination serves as the basis for substituted decision 
making." In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985) (surrogate decision-
maker may direct the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment 
for incompetent, terminally ill patient based upon that patient's "best interest"). 
218. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
219. Id. at 367. 
220. Id. at 368. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 371. 
223. Id. at 367-68. 
224. Id. at 371. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
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such an instance to exercise their responsibility and prerogative" to 
exercise the child's independent right to privacy and self-determina-
tion through their own substituted judgment. 227 The court embraced 
a quality of life approach to the issue of substituted judgment, 
finding such proxy decision-making substantiated by the terminal, 
incurable, and irreversible condition of the patient for whom the 
substituted judgment was being exercised. 
There is considerable debate within the legal community whether 
the substituted judgment doctrine survives the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 228 Even 
assuming the approach is on shaky legal ground, right-to-die cases 
involving competent patients remain particularly instructive. A living 
patient who concludes that death is preferable to her life with 
disability has made a decision with no rational basis of knowledge 
to support it, since mortals know nothing more of death than what 
we conceptualize prior to its occurrence. Courts and legislatures 
nonetheless sanction the patient's decision to end life support. 
Why then should it be any different if a living patient concludes 
that her life is no longer worth living than for a parent to conclude 
that their child would not want to be born into a life of suffering 
and thus would prefer nonexistence? It is illogical to say that because 
a living individual knows what she is giving up-life, she is thus 
competent to make the decision. The living patient is no more capable 
of concluding that death is preferable than is the handicapped child 
or her parents capable of deciding that nonlife is preferable to life 
with disability. 
227. /d. 
228. 497 u.s. 261 (1990). In Cruzan, the Court considered whether the United 
States Constitution affords an incompetent person in a persistent vegetative 
state the right, as exercised through a proxy decisionmaker, to be removed 
from artificial hydration and nutrition. The Court held that individuals have 
a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be free from unwanted bodily 
intrusion, and that the States may enact legislation that requires crear and 
convincing proof of the patient's preference for termination or withholding of 
life-sustaining treatment before that right will be recognized. [d. at 278-85. 
Thus, the case could be viewed as implicitly rejecting the substituted judgment 
approach in right-to-die cases involving incompetent patients. See generally 
Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Coming to Terms with Death: The 
Cruzan Case, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 817 (1991). 
The Cruzan decision is of little significance in the wrongful life analysis, 
however, since the Court in that case was concerned with ensuring that a proxy 
not involuntarily deprive an already living person of continued life, rather than 
with the right of a proxy to decide that a potential life should be avoided. 
Unlike right-to-die cases such as Cruzan, an infant asserting a claim for 
wrongful life is not asking that she be returned to the nonexistent "state" she 
claims to prefer; she only seeks damages as compensation for the handicapped 
life she is forced to live. 
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Tort actions other than wrongful life give rise to the same 
difficulties, yet courts addressing these cases have found it unneces-
sary to consider the metaphysical dilemma of life versus nonlife. 
Instead they appear most concerned with the end result-a prolonged 
life of suffering. 
In Estate oj Leach v. Shapiro,229 Edna Marie Leach suffered a 
cardiopulmonary arrest during treatment for a respiratory condition 
at the defendant hospital.230 Although successfully resuscitated, Mrs. 
Leach remained in a persistent vegetative state and was placed on 
life support to sustain her breathing and circulation.231 Mrs. Leach 
remained on life support for several months, after which time doctors 
informed her husband that she would never regain consciousness and 
would require indefinite life support.232 
Mrs. Leach's husband filed an action against the hospital for 
tortiously maintaining his wife on life support against her express 
will and requested damages for the pain and suffering his wife had 
endured during her wrongfully prolonged existence.233 The court held 
that, "[t]o the extent that plaintiffs can prove that this conduct was 
wrongful and caused pain and suffering beyond that which she would 
have normally suffered from her condition, they state a claim for 
relief. ' '234 
The court in Leach indicated that, although the plaintiff could 
not recover for the pain and suffering she would have experienced 
during the period she would have survived without the treatment 
(essentially viewing this as a preexisting condition), she could recover 
for the pain she experienced during the time her life was wrongfully 
prolonged beyond the point when she would have died naturally 
from her infirmities.23S In reaching its decision, the Leach court 
implicitly acknowledged that life itself can in some instances be 
injurious. 236 
229. 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
230. Id. at 1051. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 1054. 
233. Id. at 1055. 
234. Id. Although the posture of the case on appeal was the review of the probate 
court's granting of a motion to dismiss, the case is significant in that the 
appellate court reversed the probate court's ruling, thus refusing to find as a 
matter of law that the plaintiffs could not prove Mrs. Leach's extended life 
was an injury. But see Anderson v. Saint Francis-Saint George Hosp., 614 
N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting "wrongful living" cause of 
action for involuntary prolongation of life). 
235. 469 N.E.2d at 1055. 
236. See also Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference With the Right to Die: The 
Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 660-63 (1986) (advocating 
"wrongful living" cause of action for involuntary prolongation of life); Richard 
P. Dooling, Comment, Damage Actions for Nonconsensual Life-Sustaining 
Medical Treatment, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 895,916-17 (1986) (similar). 
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Right-to-die cases illustrate the reality that not all life is pref-
erable to nonexistence, and also establish the family's right to exercise 
discretion over treatment decisions, particularly where the subjective 
desires of the patient are unknown because of her incompetence. To 
a similar extent, the family in wrongful life cases has the right to 
decide for the child whether, on whole, her life is worth living. Of 
course the child might reach a different conclusion if she were 
"miraculously lucid for an interval. "237 The reality, however, is that 
it is impossible to know what the child would have preferred at the 
time of her injury. For this reason, courts must accept the family's 
decision as that of the child's.238 
It escapes explanation why courts have ignored right-to-die cases 
when ruling on the cognizability of the child's wrongful life claim. 
Arguably, right-to-die cases have overcome the more difficult issue 
of whether death is preferable to a life with even the most debilitating 
illness.239 Just as the state recognizes the right of a living person to 
avoid circumstances where the preservation of her life would serve 
only to demean or degrade her existence and humanity, the state 
should recognize the same right of the unborn, through her parents, 
to avoid birth into a life of suffering. The parents, and not the state, 
are in the best position to make decisions regarding the unborn's 
potential quality of life with or without her genetic anomalies.240 
Once that decision is made, it should be considered the decision of 
both parent and child. 
Of course the notion that no one is in a better position than 
the parents to make decisions on behalf of their potential child is 
not without exception. There will be instances where the parents' 
decision will not be, at least when viewed objectively, in the best 
interest of the child, and their decision will sometimes be negligent 
or even reckless. Notwithstanding these inevitable failings, the parents 
generally are in the best position to decide for the unborn child 
237. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger 
v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
238. See generally Rhoden, supra note 209, at 420 (advocating presumption in favor 
of family's decision to remove incompetent from life support); TOM L. BEAU-
CHAMP & JAMES F. CHU.DRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETmcs 179-80 (3d 
ed. 1989) (similar). 
239. Some commentators suggest that dying is a much more difficult concept for a 
person to accept than is never having been born at all. See Peters, supra note 
13, at 541 (" [T]he instinct of self-preservation ... may explain the conclusion 
that a miserable life is worth continuing, but not worth receiving. "); Joel 
Feinberg, Comment, Wrongful Conception and the Right Not to be Harmed, 
8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 57, 64-65 (1985) (similar). 
240. States which have enacted legislation outlawing wrongful life actions essentially 
establish as a matter of law that life in ail forms is preferable to nonexistence. 
See infra Part ILE.4. 
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whether or not her life will bring with it the joys and ple~sures that 
make it worthwhile. 
Some courts and commentators acknowledge that the parents' 
decision to avoid giving birth to an impaired child might be premised 
on their own selfish motives rather than the interests of the child.241 
The same issue has permeated right-to-die cases.242 It would be 
unreasonable not to expect that potential parents will be introspective 
when deciding the fate of the "to be" child. They wi11look at their 
own lives, which, of course, will affect the future experiences of 
their child. They will ask themselves how it would feel, physically 
and emotionally, if they were afflicted with the child's infirmities. 
Potential parents may also view the birth of an impaired child as a 
threat to their own well-being. Although the interests of the parents 
must not predominate the decision to assert the child's wrongful life 
claim, it would be equally fallacious to expect that their decision will 
be wholly removed from their own interests and expectations of what 
that child's life will bring upon themselves and the family unit. 
In some instances, depending upon the severity of the disease, 
life may be a fate worse than death. This concept of injury thus 
requires fact finders to draw a line between those injuries which are 
relatively mild and those which are so severe that on whole they can 
find with reasonable certainty that the child would have chosen 
nonlife over her life with infirmity had she been asked to decide. 
The dividing line between those handicaps which would justify 
a conclusion that nonexistence is preferable to life is difficult to 
draw, although the task is not an insurmountable one for the jury 
to assume. The ends of the spectrum are easier to identify. At one 
end, where life is arguably not worth living, are diseases which are 
so physically devastating that an individual has little chance of living 
a cognizant, sapient existence.243 Included in this category are diseases 
241. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 815 (N.Y. 1978) (Fuchsberg, J., concur-
ring); Kelly, supra note 204, at 546; Capron, supra note 196, at 603; Marten 
A. Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and 
Wrongful Birth, 16 FAM. L.Q. 15, 32 (1980). 
242. See also John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: 
§ 242.22 A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215-17, 262-64 (1975). 
243. This severity of injury approach has been advocated by numerous commentators 
in various ways. See Thomas K. Foutz, Comment, "Wrongful Life": The 
Right Not to be Born, 54 TuL. L. REv. 480, 497-98 (1980) (advocating test 
that would balance the benefits of the child's life against the severity of her 
infirmity to determine the extent (if any) of the child's injury); Note, A Cause 
of Action for "Wrongful Life": fA Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REV. 
58, 65 (1970) (similar); see also Michael D. Bayles, Harm to,the Unconceived, 
5 PHD.. & PUB. AFF. 292, 300-02 (1976) (proposing that an individual is harmed 
if she is deprived of a minimum quality of life); Morreim, supra note 11, at 
25 (similar); Peters, supra note 13, at 502 ("If the long-run burdens of life, 
such as the pain associated with a congenital affliction, outweigh the benefits 
of life, then a person can rationally prefer not to exist at all. "). 
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such as Tay-Sachs,244 Lesch-Nyhan syndrome,245 and certain neural 
tube defects,246 where the afflicted child cannot interact with her 
environment or with other people, and will have a very short lifes-
pan. 247 At the opposite end of the spectrum are less severe handicaps 
such as sickle-cell anemia248 and hereditary blindness, deafness, and 
paralysis, where the child can be expected to experience many of 
life's joys and pleasures.249 
244. See supra note 52 for a medical description of Tay-Sachs disease. 
245. Lesch-Nyhan syndrome is a genetic disorder detectable prenatally using amni-
ocentesis. Those afflicted with the disease lack motor control and demonstrate 
dramatic self-destructive behavior including self-mutilation of the extremities 
and lips which can be prevented only by physically restraining the patient. 
William L. Nyhan, Clinical Features of the Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome, 130 
ARCHfVES OF INTERN. MED. 186, 186-89 (1972). 
246. Neural tube defects (NTDs) involve fetal malformations of the central nervous 
system. There are many different forms of NTDs, varying widely in their 
degree of severity. Spina bifida cystica (meningomyelocele) is one of the more 
well-known neural tube defects. The disease involves the malformation of the 
spinal cord and the bones that envelope it, causing part of the spinal cord to 
develop outside of the back, leaving the fragile spinal nerves exposed. Other 
attributes of the disease include microencephaly (an abnormally small head), 
and hydrocephalus (an accumulation of spinal fluid in the infant's cranium), 
which if not properly drained, causes severe pain, severe brain damage, and 
inevitable paralysis and death. The condition, even if treated, usually renders 
the patient at least partially paralyzed and interferes with bowel and bladder 
control. Children afflicted with spina bifida require constant medical treatment 
and must rely on braces, crutches, and wheelchairs for mobility. Second-
trimester alpha-fetoprotein (AFP) testing of amniotic fluid and maternal serum 
can positively diagnose NTDs. First-trimester diagnosis of NTDs is not currently 
possible. See NELSON, supra note 11, at 1560-63. 
247. Peters, supra note 13, at 502-03. 
248. Sickle-cell anemia is a genetic disorder that affects the red blood cells. Those 
afflicted with the disease have less than the normal number of red blood cells 
because the lack of normal amounts of hemoglobin in the cells make them 
more rigid (sickle shaped) and thus more apt to self-destruct. Sickle-cell disease 
is highly variable in severity. "The clinical manifestations include anemia, 
jaundice and 'sickle cell crisis' marked by impaction of sickle cells, vascular 
obstructions and painful infarcts in various tissues such as the bones, spleen 
and lungs." JAMES S. THOMPSON & MARGARET W. THOMPSON, GENETICS IN 
MEDICINE ·100 (3d ed. 1980). About one in twelve Black Americans has the 
sickle-cell trait; the theoretical incidence of sickle-cell anemia among Black 
Americans is 1 in 575. Blood tests can identify carrier status of the parents 
and amniocentesis can identify the defect in the fetus. WULIAMS, supra note 
181, at 569. 
249. Peters, supra note 13, at 503. Ironically, many of the cases that have allowed 
recovery of special damages for wrongful life have involved handicaps of 
relatively mild severity. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) 
(hereditary deafness); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984) (Down's 
. syndrome); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en 
banc) (fetal hydantoin syndrome). 
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A substantial gray area joins these identifiable extremes, the 
interior of which encompasses more moderate handicaps such as 
Down's syndromelSo and cystic fibrosis. lSl It will be difficult for juries 
to evaluate each disease in terms of the benefit-burden analysis, and 
concededly, different juries will come to different conclusions. None-
theless, just as jurors are left with the discretion to award damages 
for alleged harms that are intangible and difficult to measure (such 
as emotional distress or "hedonic"2s2 damages), they are capable of 
making an evaluation whether a given life, in light of all that is 
knowable about the plaintiff's existence, is preferable to nonexistence. 
The health of the child, the opinions of experts, and the demeanor 
of witnesses will all play a part in any decision the jury will reach.2S3 
250. See supra note 31 for a medical description of Down's syndrome. 
251. Cystic fibrosis is the most common genetic disorder in the United States and 
afflicts approximately lout of every 1,800 newborns. Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 
A.2d 834, 837 (N.J. 1981). The disease causes lung infection and increased 
secretion of mucus, which makes it very difficult to breathe and slows down 
the digestion of food in the intestines. There is presently no cure for cystic 
fibrosis, although recent identification of the gene for the disease raises new 
hope for an effective treatment or cure. See, e.g., Vincent A. Fulginiti & John 
E. Lewy, Pediatrics, 270 JAMA 246 (1993). Milder cases of the disease can 
be treated through special diet, medications to aid digestion, physiotherapy to 
break up the thick mucus, and respiration machines to aid breathing. NELSON, 
supra note 10, at 1086-99. 
252. Hedonic damages compensate the victim for the loss of such things as the 
companionship of loved ones, the sound of music, the cool mist of an ocean 
breeze or the achievement of career success. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 
159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 
1988). Courts in recent years have expressed an increasing willingness to allow 
hedonic damages as part of plaintiff's claim for noneconomic compensation, 
either as a component of pain and suffering damages or as a separate form 
of damage. See Molzof v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 711, 718 (1992); see also 
Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 658 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (hedonic 
damages may be awarded as part of total disability damages caused by a 
tortious injury). See gene(allJ' Erin A. O'Hara, Note, Hedonic Damages for 
Wrongful Death: Are Tortjeasors Getting Away With Murder?, 78 GEO. L.J. 
1687 (1990). Arguably, the jury's task in a wrongful life case is much easier 
than in a case involving a claim for hedonic damages, since one who would 
not have been born would not lose any of life's benefits. See, e.g., Kelly, 
supra note 204, at 517. 
253. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (N.J. 1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting); 
see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. The severity of injury approach" 
for awarding general damages serves as a deterrent to negligent medical care, 
and is not proposed simply as a means of compensating the victim. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979); see also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC 
AN AL YSIS OF LAW 187-91 (3d· ed. 1986) (discussing the deterrent purpose and 
effect of tort law). Children born with severe handicaps will often lack the 
ability to experience pleasure, and thus will be unable to appreciate the general 
damages awarded. Instead, the award is justified under the deterrence rationale, 
which encourages tortfeasors to take optimum care by forcing them to recognize 
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Rather than deciding as a matter of law that life no matter how 
impaired is preferable to nonexistence, courts should afford the child 
and her parents the opportunity to prove that such is not always the 
case. 
The deliberation required of the jury in reaching a conclusion 
that a particular life is not worth living is similar to that required 
of infant care committees in their decisions to discontinue life support 
for seriously ill newborns.2s4 Each group is comprised of a fair cross 
section of the community, and each is required to weigh various 
factors when reaching a conclusion whether or not the child should 
live or die. Although the interdisciplinary nature of the infant care 
committee allows members to bring with them insights the average 
person may not possess, nothing prevents litigants from bringing the 
same insights and expertise into the courtroom to assist the trier of 
fact in reaching a decision as to the benefits and burdens of the 
the cost of activity which creates unreasonable risk of injury. [d. at 186. 
Particularly where the infant is severely handicapped, a court may deny 
general damages as wasteful, since the monetary award will not benefit the 
child, and will not deter unreasonable risk any more than will the award of 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages to the parents. Hence the dilemma: the 
award of general damages is particularly compelling where the child's genetic 
infirmities are severe; but yet courts are more reluctant to make such awards 
where the infirmities are so severe that the child could not benefit from the 
award. Children who are born afflicted with less severe disorders such as 
Down's syndrome may derive benefit and pleasure from nonpecuniary com-
pensation, yet, if we must create a dividing line for the award of such damages 
using the severity of injury approach, the child's infirmity itself may militate 
against such an award. 
The appropriate response is that the infant plaintiff not only benefits from 
the award, but so do potential victims of improper genetic medical care, who 
will benefit from the deterrent effect of the law by receiving more competent 
medical care. Thus, the deterrence rationale justifies general damage awards 
for the benefit of future life, and not merely as a means of compensating the 
immediate victim. See infra note 335 and accompanying text. It is more 
important that the tortfeasor pay damages than it is for the injured plaintiff 
to be compensated. See id. 
254. Hospitals that receive federal funding are encouraged to establish infant review 
committees for the purpose of educating hospital personnel and families of 
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions, recommending institutional 
policies and guidelines concerning the withholding of medically indicated treat-
ment from such infants, and offering counsel and review in cases involving 
disabled infants with life threatening conditions. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(0(1)(iii)(A) 
(1992). The federal regulation outlines a "Model Infant Care Review Com-
mittee" that must consist of at least seven interdisciplinary members, including 
a practicing physician, a practicing nurse, a hospital administrator, a represen-
tative of the legal profession, a representative of a disability group, a lay 
community member, and a member of the facility's medical staff. [d. § 
84.55(0(2). This group deliberates on the condition of the infant to determine 
whether or not an infant shall live or die. Id. 
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plaintiff's life. A properly educated and instructed jury is, arguably, 
as well equipped to make these decisions as are infant care commit-
tees. 
Another criticism of the wrongful life action takes on a "grass 
is always greener" approach. The plaintiff, the critics argue, has 
never experienced a healthy life, and, when born, will have life 
experiences relative to her handicap. Accordingly, the child suffers 
nothing since all that she knows is her present condition with its 
concomitant pain and suffering. 2ss The child cannot reach a decision 
that her life is not worth living without first experiencing what she 
now claims is her injury. In other words, the wrongful life plaintiff 
has nothing to lose from claiming her life is not worth living, since 
a verdict in her favor does not require that she return to the "state" 
of nonexistence she claims to prefer. Instead the child continues to 
live and reap the benefits of life, and at the same time benefit from 
the damages awarded for her suffering. 
These arguments fail in several respects. First, the child, although 
never able to experience greater health, remains capable of judging 
her surroundings and the quality of others' lives, which may permit 
her to reach a rational decision that the quality of her own life is 
not worth the experience of being alive.2S6 Conversely, the approach 
fails to incorporate into its assumption those children who are so 
impaired that they lack the cognitive ability to experience anything. 
In fact, it is the child's inability to experience life's pleasures that 
often gives rise to the child's claim of injury in the first place. 
Courts today are willing to recognize that medical choices should 
lie with the patient rather than with the physicians or other medical 
providers. The right-to-die cases are indicative of a growing trend 
toward recognition that life is not always preferable. The philosoph-
ical difficulties noted by most, if not all, courts which have denied 
the wrongful life action appear to be less persuasive today then they 
were in 1967 when Gleitman v. Cosgrove2S7 was decided. The inability 
of courts to say with absolute certainty that life no matter how 
impaired outweighs nonexistence does not justify the summary rejec-
tion of the child's wrongful life claim. 
2. Measuring Wrongful Life Damages in Economic Terms 
Recognizing birth as a cognizable inj~ry does not resolve the 
question of whether the wrongful life plaintiff can prove in economic 
255. See Robertson, supra note 242, at 254. 
256. Capron, supra note 189, at 655. 
257. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), overruled in part by, Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 
(N.J. 1969) (recognizing parents' wrongful birth claim for general damages); 
see also supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Gleitman decision. 
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terms the value of nonexistence against the value of life with im-
pairment.m This Article, unlike many of the cases, treats the issue 
of damages as a question of whether the plaintiff can prove the 
quantum of her damage, not whether she can prove an event of 
injury by being born. Logically, the issue of damages as defined 
herein need not be addressed unless the issue of injury is resolved in 
the plaintiff's favor. 259 
It is a basic principle of modern tort law that a cause of action 
should not be denied when the only thing preventing recovery is the 
plaintiff's inability to prove damages with specificity.260 Many courts 
have nonetheless refused to recognize the wrongful life action because 
the plaintiff cannot attribute a precise dollar amount to the value of 
nonexistence.261 In fact, even those courts which have approved the 
wrongful life action to the extent of awarding special damages have 
refused to award general damages because, they contend, those 
damages are not as easily measurable. Again, these courts appear to 
concede the existence of injury yet, rather illogically, refuse to hold 
the provider accountable for the general damages caused by the same 
breach of care.262 
Until now, this Article has focused on whether it is possible to 
say that one is harmed by being born, and has analyzed this question 
in the context of whether general damages can and should be awarded. 
The recommended answer to this question is by now apparent. Little 
258. See, e.g., Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692. 
259. Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) (en bane) ("Principles of tort 
law require that the existence of injury be ascertained first; courts should allow 
the injury caused by defendants' negligence to define the damages recoverable, 
rather than allow impairment/damage the defendant did not cause to define 
the nature of the injury. "). 
260. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 
(1931). The Court reasoned as follows: 
[d. 
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertain-
ment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perver-
sion of 'fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the 
injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer for making any 
amend for his acts. . . . [I]t will be enough if the evidence show[s] 
the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, 
although the result be only approximate. 
261. Some courts use this as the exclusive justification for rejecting the cause of 
action, while others consider this factor only after implicitly conceding that 
the plaintiff's birth is an injury to her. See Blake v. Cruz, 698 P .2d 315 (Idaho 
1984). 
262. Other courts that have considered the lack of measurable damage as the 
exclusive justification for refusing to award general or special damages for 
wrongful life also appear to concede the existence of injury. E.g., Moores v. 
Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Blake, 698 P.2d at 
322; Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Wis. 1975). 
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has been said, however, about the necessity of awarding special 
damages, which include the extraordinary costs of maintaining the 
child's handicap and the nonextraordinary child rearing costs that 
would otherwise have been averted if the child had not been born. 
Special damages are most critical to the child's continued exis-
tence and should be awarded as a matter of right once injury and 
the other elements of the wrongful life tort are proved.263 These 
damages can be ascertained with certainty, 264 and are essential to 
alleviate the burden that would otherwise be imposed upon the child's 
parents and the state to support the child during her lifetime. A 
child is entitled to these damages, especially during adulthood, pro-
vided her parents have not received an award of special damages in 
their own right for the child's care during the same period. 
An award of special damages is also important to the determi-
nation of the amount of general damages that should be awarded to 
the child. This Article posits (rather unremarkably) that the general 
damages awarded should be proportionate to the severity of the 
handicap. As in other negligence actions, special damages serve as 
an important guideline for valuing the general damages recoverable 
by the wrongful life plaintiff. There is a presumption that the greater 
the expense required to habilitate or rehabilitate the plaintiff, the 
greater the pain and suffering she will likely sustain. Logically, more 
severe handicaps will necessitate larger general damage awards, lim-
ited by any statutory damage cap in place at the state level. 265 
263. These damages should be awarded according to the strict liability approach 
advocated by this Article infra at Part IV. 
264. See generally CAROLYN S. EDWARDS, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, USDA 
ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF RAIsING A CHn.o: A GUIDE TO THEIR USE AND 
INTERPRETATION (1981). 
265. Many state legislatures have enacted statutory limits on the recovery of general 
and special damages. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-544(b), -547 (Supp. 1987) 
(limiting nonpecuniary damages to $400,'poo and total damages recoverable in 
medical malpractice claims to $1,000,(00); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.101(a), (b) 
(1986) (limiting nonpecuniary damages to $500,(00); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 
(West 1992) (limiting nonpecuniary damages to $250,000); COLO. REv. STAT. 
§ 13-21-102.5(1)-(3) (1993) (limiting nonpecuniary damages to $250,000 unless 
clear and convincing evidence justifies greater award which in no event can 
exceed $500,000); IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (Supp. 1987) (limiting nonpecuniary 
damages to $400,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-5-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1986) 
(limiting damages recoverable for any injury or death to $750,000); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 6O-3407(a) (1985) (limiting nonpecuniary damages to $250,000 and total 
damages recoverable to $1,000,(00); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 B(I) 
(West Supp. 1987) (limiting damages recoverable in medical malpractice claims, 
exclusive of future medical care and related pecuniary damages, to $500,000); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (Supp. 1994) (limiting 
nonpecuniary damages for personal injury to $500,000); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West 1986) (limiting nonpecuniary damages to $500,000 
1993] Wrongful Life 237 
3. The Benefit Doctrine of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 
When a tort victim benefits in some way from the defendant's 
conduct, the damages recoverable for the tort should be offset by 
the benefits conferred. This basic principle of mitigation is expressed 
in Section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and has been 
used by courts as a justification for refusing to award general and 
special damages for wrongful life, wrongful birth, wrongful preg-
nancy and wrongful conception. Again, it is not necessary to consider 
mitigation of damages until some damage is deemed to have been 
sustained.266 
The Restatement explains that an offset is appropriate only when 
the benefit conferred by the tort is to the same interest that was 
harmed.267 In other words, pecuniary harm should be offset by 
pecuniary benefit; nonpecuniary harm only by nonpecuniary benefit. 
Thus, for example, damages for pain and suffering resulting from a 
nonconsensual surgery should be offset by the future pain and 
suffering averted by the surgery.268 Conversely, where a prominent 
unless jury finds there is "substantial or permanent loss or impairment of a 
bodily function or substantial disfigurement, or other special circumstances" 
justifying larger award); Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.210 (1993) (limiting nonpecu-
niary damages to $350,(00); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2825 (Supp. 1986) (limiting 
total damages recoverable in medical malpractice claims to $1,000,(00); N.H. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1993) (limiting nonpecuniary damages to 
$875,(00); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1987) (limiting total damages 
recoverable in medical malpractice claims to $500,000); Omo REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2307.43 (Baldwin 1993) (limiting general damages in any medical claim not 
involving death to $200,(00); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1986) 
(limiting total damages recoverable in medical malpractice claims to $1,000,000); 
TEX. REv. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i §§ 11.02-.03 (Vernon Supp. 1994) 
(limiting total damages to $500,000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (Supp. 
1986) (limiting nonpecuniary damages in medical malpractice claims to $250,000); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1984) (limiting total damages recoverable 
in medical malpractice claims to $1,000,000); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (1986) 
(limiting nonpecuniary damages to $1,000,(00); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 
(West 1986) (limiting nonpecuniary damages to $1,000,000). 
Several courts, however, have deemed their state's statutory damage caps 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 
158 (Ala. 1991) (interpreting ALA. CODE § 6-5-544(b) (1975»; Chamberlain v. 
State ex reI. Dep't of Transp., 624 So. 2d 874 (La. 1993) (interpreting LA. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106(B)(1) (1991); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 
768 (Ohio 1991) (interpreting Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1990»; 
Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 687 (Tex. 1988) (interpreting TEX. 
REv. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i 2 § 11.02-.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986». 
266. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. b (1979) ("Damages resulting 
from an invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing that another 
interest has been benefitted. "). 
268. [d. § 920 cmt. a, illus. 1. 
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attorney seeks nonpecuniary damages for the emotional pain and 
suffering caused by the defendant's libelous remarks, the defendant 
cannot assert in mitigation that the adverse publicity, for whatever 
reason, increased the plaintiff's volume of business.269 The pecuniary 
interest enhanced by the tort-the increase in business-is dissimilar 
to the nonpecuniary harm to reputation suffered by the attorney. 
When properly applied to wrongful life and wrongful birth cases, 
the benefit doctrine requires offset of general damages by the intan-
gible value of life to the child and her parents. Similarly, the parents' 
emotional harm could conceivably be offset by the emotional harm 
they would have sustained had they chosen to abort the fetus,270 or 
by the emotional joys and benefits derived from the child's existence. 
The parents' recovery of child-rearing and extraordinary expenses 
should be offset by the pecuniary benefits the parents will derive 
from the child's life.271 
Many courts have based their refusal to award general and 
special damages in wrongful life and other birth-related tort actions 
on the plaintifFs inability to disprove that the value of her life 
exceeds the pain and suffering she endures as a result of the mal-
practice. Accordingly, courts refuse to award general damages be-
cause the joys and benefits of the handicapped life to both parent 
and child offset any damages resulting from that life. Some courts 
have violated the similar interests requirement of the benefit doctrine 
and have denied recovery of special damages after concluding that 
the intangible pleasures of handicapped existence o.ffset the special 
269. Id. § 920 cmt. b. 
270. Surprisingly, this issue of mitigation has not been raised in any reported 
decision on wrongful birth. Numerous studies have been undertaken to deter-
mine the psychological effect of abortion on women at various stages post-
abortion, ranging from several minutes after the abortion to greater than ten 
years after the date of the procedure. The conclusions reached by these studies 
are evenly balanced between those which document significant post-abortion 
emotional trauma and those which discount any emotional effect whatever, 
especially during the first trimester of the pregnancy. Compare Nancy Adler 
et aI., Psychological Responses After Abortion, 248 SCIENCE 41, 43 (1990) 
("[S]evere negative reactions after abortion are rare and can best be understood 
in the framework of coping with a normal life stress.") with H.R. REp. No. 
392, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1989) ("[T]he psychological effects of abortion 
are unclear. . .. [S]ome researchers have concluded that the psychological 
impact of abortion is very negative, whereas others say that they are usually 
more positive than carrying an unwanted child. ") (referencing Medical and 
Psychological Impact of Abortion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human 
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 68-71, 219-
222 (1989) (testimony of C. Everett Koop, M.D., Surgeon General of the 
United States». . 
271. Offset of pecuniary damage is not appropriate in most instances because neither 
the parents nor the child usually benefits economically from the child's birth. 
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damages occasioned by the malpractice.272 Theoretically, only the 
economic benefits of the child's handicapped life should offset the 
special economic damages caused by the child's handicap. 
The difficulty with the benefit doctrine as applied in wrongful 
life actions is that the plaintiff is saddled with the burden of proving 
that the benefits of nonexistence exceed· the burdens of her life with 
handicap. The burden properly should be on· the defendant to prove 
an offsetting benefit conferred by her tortious conduct. 273 Once the 
plaintiff has sustained the burden of proving an event of harm by 
being born, the defendant should bear the burden of proving the 
benefits derived from the child's existence outweigh the burdens 
caused by her disease. 274 Perhaps a presumption favoring nonexistence 
would equalize the burden of proof in wrongful life cases and increase 
the plaintiff's chance of recovery. 
E. Public Policy Considerations: The Fifth Element of the Tort 
Framework 
A continuing debate essential to modern jurisprudence involves 
the role public policy should play in the shaping of judicial decisions. 
On one side of the debate are those jurists who maintain that 
judicially declared public policy is a useful doctrine that helps the 
law embrace a more humanistic approach and "brings into the case 
an element extrinsic from the conduct of the parties-the exercise of 
community control quite apart from statute, judicial precedent or 
doctrine. "275 On the opposite side of the debate are those who assert 
that decisions based on public policy add a degree of uncertainty to 
the law that makes it more difficult for individuals to conform their 
behavior to the law.276 If public policy is to shape the law, they 
272. E.g., Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 332 N.W.2d 
432, 435 (Mich. App. 1982). Several wrongful pregnancy and wrong.ful con-
ception cases have misapplied the benefit doctrine by offsetting the parents' 
claim for pecuniary damages by the nonpecuniary benefits they derive from 
parenthood. See University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d ·1294 (Ariz . 
. 1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 
A.2d 429 (Md. 1984); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Sherlock v. 
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). 
273. See Kelly, supra note 204, at 520 ("To deny recovery because the defendant 
cannot produce exculpatory evidence seems backwards. ") (citing Melinda A. 
Roberts, Distinguishing Wrongful From "Rightful" Life, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL'y 59, 69-70 (1990». 
274. See Roberts, supra note 273, at 67-70. 
275. James D. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 
BROOKLYN L. REv. 323, 323 (1971). 
276. See Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (C.P. 1824) ("[Public 
policy) is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never 
know where it wilf carry you .... "); see also Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 10 
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argue, legislative pronouncement should be the sole source of its 
influence.277 
Negative public policy implications have been cited by many 
courts as a reason for denying claims for wrongful life and wrongful 
birth. This section examines the policy considerations upon which 
courts have based their refusal to recognize the wrongful life action, 
and concludes that none of the policy reasons cited by courts justifies 
the denial of a child's right to recover damages for her wrongful 
life. 
1. Parental Liability 
One implication of recognizing the wrongful life action is that 
a child may attempt to sue her parents for erroneous decisions to 
conceive or proceed with the pregnancy after being fully informed 
of the substantial risk that the child would be born with a birth 
defect. Concededly, a negligent decision by parents has the same 
effect on the child as does the medical provider's failure to disclose 
the information to the parents. If parents are to complain that they 
have been deprived of their freedom to make an informed choice on 
behalf of their potential child, what responsibilities do they have to 
the child to make a responsible choice? How much freedom should 
parents have in exercising their informed choice? Some of these issues 
were addressed as dictum by the California Supreme Court in Cur-
lender v. Bio-Science Laboratories: 
If a case arose where, despite due care by the medical 
profession in transmitting the necessary warnings, parents 
made a conscious choice to proceed with a pregnancy, with 
full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant would be 
born, that conscious choice would provide an intervening 
act of proximate cause to preclude [wrongful life] liability 
insofar as defendants other than the parents were concerned. 
Under such circumstances, we see no sound public policy 
which should protect those parents from being answerable 
for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought 
upon their offspring.278 
The staggering implications of parental liability for wrongful life 
condoned by the Curlender court prompted the California legislature 
Eng. Rep. 359, 408-09 (H.L. 1853) ·(explaining that public policy may vary 
depending upon the education, habits, tastes, and dispositions of the person 
to whom the inquiry is addressed), cited in American Casualty Ins. Co. 's Case, 
34 A. 778, 785 (Md. 1896). 
277. Hopkins, supra note 275, at 331-32. 
278. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
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to enact a law prohibiting parental suits in wrongful life cases.279 
Permitting children to maintain actions against their parents for 
wrongful life is unsound. Such suits may chill the parents' consti-
tutional right to make unencumbered procreative choices.280 The 
number of aborted pregnancies may rise, not because of the parents' 
reasoned determination that the child would not want to live such a 
life, but out of fear that a contrary decision would be challenged by 
the child at some point after her birth. 
Children seeking pecuniary damages for their special care with 
handicap have little to gain and much to lose in suing a parent, 
particularly if the family unit is intact. As one commentator has 
noted: "Parents are already legally obliged to support their children, 
and most do so to the limits of their ability whether the child is 
normal or not. "281 A different conclusion may be appropriate if the 
parent-child relationship no longer exists, since voluntary care is no 
longer a given and preservation of the family unit may not be a 
concern.282 
Some jurists argue that there must be a limit to legal account-
ability of parents for so-called "irresponsible" choices.283 Allowing 
children to sue parents for their decisions would render nugatory 
"the freedom of choice now extolled in genetic counseling. "284 The 
right to be free from interference in decisions on procreation, how-
ever, does not necessarily affirm the righteousness of a decision to 
bring a child into the world. In some cases it might be possible to 
279. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982). 
280. See Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc) (dictum). See 
generally Joan Waters, Wrongful Life: The Implications of Suits in Wrongful 
Life Brought by Children Against Their Parents, 31 DRAKE L. REv. 411 (1981) 
(a wrongful life claim brought by a child against her mother is irreconcilable 
with the mother's right to privacy). 
281. Capron, supra note 196, at 602. 
282. Cf. Smith v. Gross, 571 A.2d 1219, 1224 (Md. 1990) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) 
(the parent-child immunity rule should not be applied where the child is 
deceased, because there is no family discipline to impair or home tranquility 
to preserve). 
283. See Sonnenberg, supra note 196, at 498 ("The essence of the [wrongful life] 
action is that parents should be able to make an informed decision whether a 
genetically defective child should be born, not that those parents should make 
the 'right decision.'''). 
284. Callahan, supra note 186, at 86. But see Shaw, supra note 10, at 102-04 
(arguing for parental liability where they proceed with a pregnancy fully aware 
of a significant risk of giving birth to a genetically impaired child); see also 
Ron Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability 
for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 
357 (1984) (states that have abolished parental immunity should recognize a 
tort duty owed by a mother to her unborn child). 
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say that the parents have made a "poor" decision and have wronged 
the child. 285 
Although the conflict between the interests of the parents and 
the potential child is difficult to reconcile, it is possible to strike a 
balance between the parents' unencumbered procreative rights and 
the harm to the child upon the making of a reckless decision. Courts 
have not hesitated to intervene on behalf of children when their 
parents' decision, although based on their own moral and religious 
beliefs, is against the best interests of the child.286 These interventive 
efforts on behalf of the child suggest there is a point where the 
freedom of' parental decision-making must yield to the interests of 
the state and the child. 
Parents at risk for giving birth to children afflicted with genetic 
disorders will come to different decisions about whether or not to 
proceed with the pregnancy. Parents faced with a prognosis that their 
child will be born with Tay-Sachs disease, for example, would more 
likely avoid bringing the child into the world. Other diseases, such 
as cystic fibrosis,287 may not manifest the same degree of severity or 
immediacy of onset, and parents may not come to the same conclu-
sion that the child's life should be avoided. By whom and by what 
standard should the propriety of the parents' decision be judged? 
Would a "reasonable parent" standard be .appropriate?288 
. Judging a parent's actions in bringing about the child's life from 
the perspective of a reasonable person is unsound since most decisions 
in this regard are based upon individualized moral and religious 
beliefs. This does not mean, however, that the Learned Hand 
285. L.M. Purdy, Genetic Diseases: Can Having Children be Immoral?, in BIOMED-
ICAL ETHICS, supra note 31, at 468. 
286. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. 
Wash. 1967), afI'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
287. See supra note 251. 
288. The California Supreme Court has adopted a "reasonable parent" standard 
for judging whether parental conduct is actionable by way of a negligence 
action brought by the child. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P .2d 648, 652-53 (Cal. 
1971); see also Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980). See 
generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to 
Unemancipated Child Caused By Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 
A.L.R.4th 1066 (1981). Statistics on parental procreative decision-making in 
situations where a fetus is diagnosed with a genetic disorder could help to 
define the reasonable parent standard. See Ruth Faden et aI., Prenatal Screening 
and Pregnant Women's Attitudes Toward the Abortion of Defective Fetuses, 
77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 288 (1987) (reporting that 80Ofo of 490 women believed 
abortion was justified after amniocentesis confirmed neural tube defect in 
fetus); Mitchell S. Golbus et al., Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis in 3000 Amnio-
centeses, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157, 160 (1979) (reporting that 93.8% of 
women elected to terminate their pregnancies after genetic abnormalities were 
detected in their fetuses). 
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formula289 could not be applied on a case-by-case basis to judge 
whether or not the' parents' choice was negligent. 290 Again, consid-
eration should be given to the child's possible condition and the 
competing interests of the parents in bringing about her life, factoring 
into the analysis the parents' moral and religious convictions. 
2. Sanctity of Life 
The sanctity of life argument, which posits that life no matter 
how impaired is sacrosanct, has been at the root of numerous court 
decisions denying claims for wrongful life. 291 The right-to-die cases 
and common sense, however, dictate that life is not always a blessing; 
rather the' sanctity of life is wholly dependent on the quality of that 
life.292 
The sanctity of life argument fails to reconcile those instances 
where the quality of the life is so reduced that the reasonable 
individual would deem it an unmitigatible burden.293 If life is indeed 
priceless, the law should require that medical providers render their 
services in such a way as to promote the utmost quality of potential 
life. It would be unreasonable to conclude that society's outlook on 
the sanctity of life incorporates lives of great suffering. As right-to-
289. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(Hand, 1.) ("[IJf the probability [of injuryJ be called P; the [gravity of the] 
injury, L; and the burden [of adequate precaution], B; liability depends upon 
whether B is less than L multiplied by P .... "). 
290. Dworkin, supra note 189, at 100; see also Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 
871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (remanding case to trial court to determine whether 
mother's decision to use tetracycline during her pregnancy constituted a rea-
sonable exercise of parental discretion). 
291. See Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran 
Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 702 (III. 1987); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 
635, 642 (Kan. 1986); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 352-53 (N.H. 1986); 
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (N.l. 1979); see also Rogers, supra note 95, 
at 752-53. 
292. "Any attempt to make life-understood as a set of vital logical processes-
unconditionally good in itself is a 'vitalism' that should be rejected in favor 
of a view that life is only conditionally good. ". BEAUCHAMP & CHD.DRESS, supra 
note 238, at 157 (citing Richard A. McCormick, The Quality of Life; The 
Sanctity of Life, HASTINGS CENTER REp. 8 (Feb. 1978». As another commen-
tator has aptly recognized, 
life is not merely a matter of being alive in some purely biological or 
bio-physical sense of the term. Something can be alive or capable of 
life in the latter sense, yet not alive or capable of life in the sense 
implied in or by the expressions mentioned above. . . . [A] full life 
... is one full of significant experience and activity, and we apply it 
in the first instance only to human beings. 
Henry D. Aiken, Life and Right to Life, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS, 
supra note 52, at 173. 
293. Kelly, supra note 204, at 498-500. 
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die cases illustrate, there is a point where the need to alleviate pain 
and suffering reduces the efficacy of the life-at-all-cost philosophy. 
Taking the sanctity of life argument to its logical end, a child 
would have no right of action even if the medical provider maliciously 
withheld information from the parents. Why should the law allow 
for such an abuse of medical authority on the altar of the sanctity 
of human life, particularly when the rest of society must account for 
similar conduct in other contexts, and may even be called upon to 
support the child's handicapped existence? The consequences of the 
sanctity of life argument appear unreasonable. 
Some argue that improvements in prenatal diagnosis have shifted 
the efforts of the scientific community away from disease treatment 
in favor of disease prevention.294 Society will therefore embrace higher 
standards for human health, and will look upon those born with 
avoidable handicaps as unfit to be alive. 295 The issue is well stated 
by ethicist Leon Kass, who warns: 
A child with Down's syndrome or with hemophilia or with 
muscular dystrophy born at a time when most of his (po-
tential) fellow sufferers be destroyed prenatally is liable to 
be looked upon by the community as one unfit to be alive, 
as a second class (or even lower) human type. He may be 
seen as a person who need not have been, and who would 
not have been, if only someone had gotten to him in time. 296 
According to this view, society will become increasingly critical of 
minor physical and social handicaps and will accept nothing less than 
the "perfect human. "297 "[T]he concept of 'normality' sufficient to 
make life worth living is bound to be 'upgraded,' and the acceptance 
of 'abnormality' and care for abnormal is bound to be degraded in 
our society." 298 Thus, the threshold for those ailments justifying 
294. ANDREWS, supra note 185, I1t 137. 
295. E.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (N.H. 1986). 
296. Leon R. Kass, Implications oj Prenatal Diagnosis jor the Human Right to 
Life, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS, supra note 52, at 185, 189. 
297. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978). 
298. Callahan, supra note 186, at 85. Ethicist Daniel Callahan points out that "while 
in principle the parents of a fetus with a detected case of Down's syndrome 
are still left to decide whether to carry it to term, ... it is possible to. detect 
tendencies which would rob people of their choice and 'blame' them for the 
defective children they bring into the world." Id. But see Dworkin, supra note 
189, at 96 (wrongful birth actions do not devalue the child's life but serve only 
to compensate the parents and assure the child maximum life opportunities by 
freeing her of the economic burdens precipitated by her impaired existence); 
Shaw, supra note 10, at 110 ("[I)f there were fewer persons born with birth 
defects, society might become more aware of, and more sensitive to, their 
needs, cherish them as individuals, and seek better ways to provide for them."). 
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prenatal diagnosis, and even state intervention in decisions of con-
traception and abortion, may be lowered to dangerous levels, inevi-
tably leading to the adoption of laws compelling eugenics. 
Improvements in genetic technology must advance, even at the 
expense of social stigma. Tort law is not responsible for the stigma 
associated with being born with a given handicap; it serves only to 
encourage prudent behavior through pecuniary penalty. Thus, the 
exactitude of science, and not the expansion of tort law, will make 
it increasingly difficult for society to accept the birth of avoidably 
impaired children. The wrongful life action adds little to the possi-
bility of such an unfortunate phenomenon as social stigmatization, 
since scientific advancement will occur with or without the action. 
3. Defensive Medicine 
Opponents of wrongful life assert that recognition of the action 
will cause medical providers to practice defensive medicine, causing 
overuse of genetic testing even where not medically indicated simply 
to avoid potential liability.299 Thus, contrary to the proponents' yiew 
that permitting wrongful life will improve the standard of medical 
care by forcing medical providers to be more diligent in their practice, 
opponents suggest that the action will actually cause medical care to 
become too costly for those who can least afford it.3°O 
State-of-the-art scientific technology, not the law itself, defines 
the standard of medical care expected of providers and imposed by 
law. The law merely measures the utility and practicality of a given 
procedure against the provider's failure to utilize it. 301 Only then does 
the law impart an obligation upon the provider to practice according 
to this standard. The law does not create the standard; science does 
that. 
So long as parents have freedom of procreative decision-making, 
they can control the destiny of affected children. Prenatal diagnosis 
Professor Shaw continues by posing this rhetorical question: "Is it true that if 
we could raise the standard of living of most of those living at poverty levels, 
then those who were still poor would be treated worse, not better ... ?" [d. 
299. James Bopp, Jr. et aI., The "Rights" and "Wrongs" of Wrongful Birth and 
Wrongful Life: A Jurisprudential Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. 
REv. 461, 486-90 (1989). 
300. [d. at 489. 
301. Science, however, independently implements a risk-utility balancing whenever 
it develops new medical technologies for use in the field. The Food and Drug 
Administration's approval of pharmaceuticals is an excellent example of such 
a balancing. Only when the benefits of a particular drug outweigh its potential 
'adverse effects is the drug approved for use in the field. The argument that 
science would not embrace a risk-utility standard in the absence of legal sanction 
may therefore be unjustified. 
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has taken the mystery out of genetic defects and "parents no longer 
accept genetic defects in their children as an ill which God or nature 
visits upon them. "302 Although the choice is ultimately with the 
parents, the genetic counselor has, at very least, an obligation to 
impart all the available information necessary to that decision. When 
the genetic counselor fails in this respect, the opportunity of procre-
ative choice has been withheld from the parents. Without the law as 
a deterrent on negligent and reckless health care, the genetic counselor 
has less incentive to perform adequately and more incentive to ignore 
the wishes of the parents, the child, and society , all of whom desire 
to avoid lives of great suffering. 
There is no debating that medicine is not an exact science; there 
are many uncertainties and no guarantees. However, when science 
enlightens society to the causes, treatments, and cures of disease, the 
medical community should be expected to conform to the technolog-
ical advancement and heightened societal expectations of the medical 
care society receives. Likewise, the law should embrace these im-
provements in the standard of care. The wrongful life action seeks 
to achieve this end-to encourage more prudent genetic care for the 
unborn and her parents. 
4. Judicial Deference to Legislative Pronouncement 
Several courts have refused to recognize the wrongful life action 
on the basis that the action presents profound issues of public policy 
better left for legislative resolution. 303 In refusing to legislate from 
the bench, however, these courts no doubt recognize the improbability 
that their state's legislature would legitimate the wrongful life action. 
In essence, these courts have "made a decision by not making a 
decision. "304 
A claim for wrongful life will not be actionable under all 
circumstances. The child must first prove that her handicap is one 
which would justify her preference for nonexistence. Legislatures are 
incapable of identifying in the abstract those conditions that would 
justify such a claim and those that would not. A statute that simply 
provides that wrongful life is an actionable tort would be of limited 
usefulness, since the trier of fact would still be required to scrutinize 
the child's handicaps and the beliefs and opinions of family members 
302. ANDREWS, supra note 185, at 138; see also Ellis v. Sherman, 478 A.2d 1339 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (refusing to recognize wrongful life action). 
303. See Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ind. 1991); Becker v. 
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 
528, 537 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986). 
304. Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 775 (Md. 1993) (Chasanow, J., concurring in 
part). 
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as to the child's preference for nonexistence before it could determine 
whether the child's claim for wrongful life is meritorious. 305 
Deference to legislative pronouncement is not the appropriate 
response to the wrongful life action. As one commentator has ex-
pressed, "[i] f the. view of public policy expressed by the courts is 
not acceptable, the legislature may speedily revise the expression by 
appropriate statutory provision.' '306 Some state legislatures have dem-
onstrated disapproval of their court's wrongful life and wrongful 
birth decisions, and have passed legislation prohibiting these ac-
tions.307 
The vast majority of state legislatures to pass legislation on 
wrongful life and wrongful birth actions have denied the actions 
outright. At least eight states have enacted legislation which prohibits 
actions for wrongful life and/or wrongful birth.3°S Although the 
scope of the legislation varies, each law effectively permits the state 
to substitute its judgment for that of the child and imposes upon 
the family unit a uniform rule that life is always preferable.309 The 
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting wrongful life and/or wrongful 
birth actions has been confirmed by at least two state appellate 
courts,310 but has been challenged by several commentators. 3I1 
305. Cf. id. 
306. Hopkins, supra note 275, at 331. 
307. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. App. Ct. 
1980) (dictum), superseded by CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982); Blake v. 
Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984), superseded by IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1990); 
Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981), superseded by 42 PA. CONST. 
STAT. ANN. § 8305(a)-(b) (Supp. 1993). 
308. See supra note 307; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-11 (Burns Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 32-03-43 (Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (1987); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1987 & Supp. 1989). Currently, Maine is the only state 
to enact legislation affording infants the right to maintain a wrongful life 
action for the limited purpose of collecting special damages. ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1990). Similar legislation has been proposed in 
other states. For example, legislators in the State of Washington proposed the 
following: "Damages for the birth of an unhealthy child born as a result of 
professional negligence shall be limited to damage associated with the disease, 
defect or handicap suffered by the child." H.B. 178, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(1983); S.A.B. 3269, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1983). 
309. Capron, supra note 189, at 653. 
310. See Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13-15 (Minn. 1986) 
(en banc) (construing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1989»; Dansby v. 
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 819-21 (Pa. 1993) (construing 
42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a)-(b) (Supp. 1993». 
311. See generally Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative 
Curtailment, 100 HARv. L. REV. 2017 (1987) (legislation prohibiting wrongful 
birth actions is unconstitutional). Contra Recent Developments, To Be or Not 
to Be: The Pennsylvania General Assembly Eliminates Wrongful Birth and 
Life Actions, 34 VILL. L. REv. 681 (1989) (state legislation prohibiting wrongful 
life and wrongful birth actions is constitutional). 
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Those legislatures that have adopted prohibitive legislation should 
rethink their positions, and those which have not yet addressed the 
issue should do so with the aim of aiding tbose who innocently must 
suffer for the practice of careless medicine. 312 
IV. STRICT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE GENETIC 
COUNSELING 
One alternative for holding medical providers accountable on 
principles of negligence is to impose upon them strict liability for 
their life-causing omissions. According to this approach, damages 
would inure to the plaintiff not merely because the provider's neg-
ligence caused an otherwise avoidable life, but because the avoidable 
life will bring with it foreseeable suffering. Imposing strict liability 
on providers who disseminate avoidably inaccurate genetic informa-
tion will reduce the burden on the plaintiff to prove her life with 
handicap constitutes a legally cognizable injury, and will likewise 
relieve the courts of the unnecessary metaphysical considerations they 
contend prevent any monetary award for wrongful life.313 
A. Strict Products Liability as a Model 
Strict products liability is a tort theory that has arisen out of 
warranty law as a means by which users and consumers of products 
may recover for injuries sustained from "defective products."314 The 
genesis of strict products liability can be attributed to several twen-
tieth century decisions by Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of 
California.315 The essence of those decisions is incorporated into 
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which a majority 
of jurisdictions has adopted as the basis for imposing strict products 
liability.316 
312. Legislators may wish to consider various proposed model statutes. See ME. 
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1990); Kathryn J. Jankowski, Wrongful 
Birth and Wrongful Life Actions Arising From Negligent Genetic Co'unseling: 
The Need for Legislation Supporting Reproductive Choice, 17 FORDHAM URBAN 
L.I. 27, 56-57 (1989); Bruce L. Belton, Comment, Wrongful Life: A Legislative 
Solution to Negligent Genetic Counseling, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 77, 106-08 (1983). 
313. Cf Ron Weiss, Comment, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: In Search of 
a Logical Consistency, 2 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 507, 521-22 (1987) (advocating 
no-fault liability for wrongful life). 
314. See infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text (discussing defectiveness of 
products). 
315. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (Traynor, 
J.); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
316. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (Traynor, J., Reporter's 
A'dvisory Committee Member). Today, courts have modified their approach to 
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Strict liability is generally thought of as liability without fault-
liability imposed merely because an act was committed without regard 
to the level of care exercised by the defendant in seeking to avoid 
the risk of harm to others.317 This portrayal of strict products liability, 
however, is not completely accurate because the defendant's culpa-
bility remains an important factor in the analysis. 3J8 Under strict 
products liability, a seller of a defective product319 is liable if the 
strict liability and rely less on the dictate of section 402A for their decisions. 
FISHER & POWERS, supra note 175, at 49; see also infra note 319 (discussing 
various tests for determining whether a product is defective). See generally 
John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products. 44 MISS. 
L.J. 825, 829-31 (1973) (reviewing legislative history of section 402A). 
317. The Restatement approach to strict products liability is not the only common 
law source for the imposition of strict liability. The owners of wild animals 
who stray and injure bystanders are held strictly liable for any reSUlting injury 
notwithstanding the owner's utmost care in keeping the animal. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 504 (1977). Similarly. those who participate in ultraha-
zardous activity, such as blasting. are held strictly liable for injuries to third 
persons. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 551-54 (5th 
ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1965) (listing 
factors). The abnormality of the risk, a consideration relevant in products 
cases, is the basis for the imposition of strict liability in non-product cases as 
well. KEETON ET AL., supra, at 542. 
318. Although implicit in the meaning of "strict liability" is the concept of liability 
without fault, many jurists recognize that fault remains an element in strict 
products liability actions. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153. 
1161-62 (Cal. 1972); Phipps v. General Motors Corp .• 363 A.2d 955,963 (Md. 
1976); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974); see also 
Michael M. Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied 
Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661, 697 (concluding 
that application of strict liability to service transactions makes persons who 
render services liable for most but not all failures); William C. Powers, Jr., 
The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 777-82, 
791-94 (1983) (asserting that the distinction between negligence and defectiveness 
in strict liability is illusory); infra note 333. 
319. A multiplicity of tests have been devised to address whether a product is 
"defective" so as to justify imposition of strict products liability. Each incor-
porates some form of culpability into its analysis. They include the unreasonably 
dangerous test, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965); the 
risk-utility test, Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or. 
1974); the consumer expectation test. Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 
1511. 1514 (6th Cir. 1983); failure to warn, Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 
F.2d 121. 128-29 (9th Cir. 1968); the cheapest cost-avoider test. Guido Calabresi 
& Jon T. Hirschoff. Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 
1055, 1060 (1972); and the causation test, Richard A. Epstein. A Theory of 
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). The theories underlying these 
tests are equally applicable to the imposition of strict liability for medical 
services and are discussed more fully infra at Part IV.C. For a detailed 
discussion of these tests in the strict products liability context, see generally 
FISHER & POWERS, supra note 175, at 57-123 and Frank 1. Vandall. Applying 
Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal Analysis, 59 IND. L.J. 
25, 41-48 (1983). 
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plaintiff can show that the product was unreasonably dangerous and 
the defect was present when the product left the seller's control.320 
Prior to the development of strict liability, negligence law pro-
vided the only means by which a consumer could recover for injuries 
caused by defective products. The unique position of both the seller 
and the user, however, brought to light several shortcomings in the 
negligence theory which disadvantaged the consumer plaintiff and 
which caused courts to formulate modifications to the negligence 
approach. 321 The essence of strict liability today "is to insure that 
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by 
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by 
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.' '322 
At the core of any strict products liability action is proof that 
a product was defective. The defect may be one of design, manu-
facture, or failure to warn of a danger inherent in the use or misuse 
of a product. Courts have developed various tests in their attempts 
to evaluate whether or not a product is defective.323 The predominant 
tests, most frequently applied in design defect cases, are the risk-
utility and consumer expectation tests. 
The risk-utility test incorporates the Learned Hand cost-benefit 
formula familiar to negligence actions by balancing the likelihood 
and magnitude of harm against the usefulness of the product and 
the ability of the designer at reasonable expense to make the design 
safer.324 Where the utility or affordability of the product would be 
destroyed by an alternate, albeit safer design, the design at issue is 
not defective. 325 
A product is defective under the consumer expectation test if 
the product is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the 
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its character-
istics. "326 The type of product in dispute usually dictates the class of 
persons that comprise the ordinary user or consumer. A machine 
used only by machinists would be defective only if the ordinary 
machinist would not anticipate the attendant risk of injury posed by 
320. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965). 
321. See infra Part IV.C. (discussing policy reasons for imposing strict liability). 
322. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). 
323. See supra note 319. 
324. Cj. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(Hand, J.); see also supra note 289. 
325. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-57 (Cal. 1978); Phillips v. 
Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Or. 1974); Wade, supra note 316, 
at 837-38. 
326. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
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the machine during its ordinary use;327 an alleged defect in an 
automobile would be judged according to the expectations of the 
ordinary driver. 328 
B. Erroneous Genetic Counseling as a Defective Treatment 
The same considerations relevant to a finding of defectiveness 
of products are applicable to the determination of defectiveness in 
the genetic counseling process. A consumer of products justifiably 
relies on the seller to introduce into the market products which are 
safe. To the same extent, the patient relies on the genetic counselor 
to disseminate accurate information on the risk of giving birth to a 
genetically impaired child. Under either the risk-utility or consumer 
expectation approach, failed genetic counseling meets the definition 
of defectiveness as that term is used in products cases. 
The complexity of the genetic information and the patient's 
inability to partake in the genetic evaluation process suggests that 
the patient relies on the genetic counselor to a gteater extent than 
the average consumer relies on the seller of products to produce safe 
ones. 329 Those prospective parents in need of genetic counseling 
represent the class of ordinary consumers whose expectations are 
relevant to the quality of treatment they expect. Their expectations, 
in combination with the known risks of error disclosed by the 
counselor, establish the standard under a strict liability analysis. 
Ordinary patients do not expect perfect results, nor do they expect 
a cure where one is not promised.330 Likewise, prospective parerits 
do not expect the birth a perfect baby and remain aware that the 
unbridled acts of nature may cause unexpected misfortune. 
Prospective parents expect reasonable care in the dissemination 
of genetic information, which includes accurate testing for genetic 
conditions, evaluation of test results, and disclosure of material risks 
327. See Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co., 448 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 1983) (punch 
press); cf. Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio) (punch 
press is defective if more dangerous than ordinary consumer expectation), cert. 
denied sub nom. Cincinnati Milicron Chems., Inc. v. Blankenship; 459 U.S. 
857 (1982). 
328. See Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511 (6th Cir. 1983) (automobile 
hardtop); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 545 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1976) (automobile side window), rev'd on other grounds, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 
1977). 
329. Greenfield, supra note 318, at 689-90; Timothy J. Crowley & Tony L. Johan-
nsen, Comment, Extending Strict Liability to Health Care Providers: Can 
Consumers Afford the Protection?, 13 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1435, 1462 (1982); 
William R. Hadley, Note, Torts-Strict Liability-The Medical Malpractice 
Citadel Still Stands-Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444,256 N.W.2d 379 (1977), 
11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1357, 1371 (1978). 
330. See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1973). 
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of error in the counseling process. If attainment of a reliable diag-
nosis of the genetic condition is possible prior to the conception or 
birth of a handicapped child, the failure to attain a diagnosis of the 
condition would render the treatment defective. If state-of-the-art 
technology allows for the accurate diagnosis of the condition with 
which the child is born, then it is reasonable for the parents as 
consumers to expect that the condition will be diagnosed.331 
Because medical providers involved in wrongful life cases have 
not caused the genetic anomaly, but have deprived the patient of 
necessary information, genetic counseling is uniquely suited for the 
application of strict liability. A failed procedure may prevent a parent 
from making the ultimate decision to proceed with or to terminate 
a pregnancy, but it is never alleged that a failed procedure caused' 
the impairment, at least in the literal sense of the word "caused. "332 
A genetic counselor would not be strictly liable merely because a 
child is born with a detectible disorder. A showing of breach of care 
would remain a necessary prerequisite to recovery. 333 
A genetic counselor whose obligation is to discern the possibility 
of genetic abnormality in patients and potential children is keenly 
aware of the risks as well as the harm that may result from an error 
in treatment. The counselor must expect that parents will rely on the 
information they receive, and should recognize the profound harm 
that will come to potential life if genetic information is not properly 
communicated to those who must act upon it. 334 
331. See Hadley, supra note 329, at 1378. But see Cunningham v. MacNeal Mem. 
Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ill. 1970) (state-of-the-art evidence is not relevant 
in strict products liability claims), superseded by ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, para. 
181 (1973). 
332. As discussed supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text, the medical provider's 
omission may be seen as "causing" the handicap in an abstract sense, since 
she necessarily causes the life with handicap. 
333. This Article does not advocate a standard of "absolute liability" as opposed 
to one of "strict liability" in wrongful life cases. The plaintiff must demonstrate 
that she was owed a duty as a consumer, that incorrect medical information 
was disseminated, and that the disseminated information was relied on by her 
parents. Although strict liability makes it easier for the plaintiff to recover 
where proof of negligence is difficult, it does not abandon every consideration 
relevant to the law of negligence. See supra note 318 and accompanying text 
and infra note 379 and accompanying text. 
334. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977). This 
assumes the parents would have acted on the information had they been 
provided with it. Otherwise, one coiIld not say that a medical provider's breach 
of care proximately caused the child's life. See supra Part III.C. A similar 
approach is adopted in products cases involving misuse of otherwise safe 
products, where a finding of defectiveness often turns on whether the misuse 
was foreseeable. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th 
Cir. 1962); Dosier v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136-67 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1975); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 20 (Md. 1975). 
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The number of wrongful life cases reported to date indicates 
that the risk of erroneous genetic counseling is substantial when 
established medical standards are not followed. Further, the gravity 
of potential harm-the involuntary creation of an avoidable, handi-
capped life-is profound. The cost to the genetic counselor in avoid-
ing the giving of erroneous advice is minimal, however; all she must 
do is adhere to established medical standards. No greater standard 
is either necessary or proposed under this analysis. As discussed 
below, however, the present inability of the legal system to redress 
the plight of the handicapped child who sues for wrongful life offers 
little incentive for the genetic counselor to take the necessary steps 
to avoid erroneous genetic counseling.33S 
C. Policy Considerations for Imposing Strict Liability 
Once a product is deemed defective, a number of policy ration-
ales justify imposing strict liability upon the manufacturer or distrib-
utor of the product. They include (1) the difficulty of proving specific 
acts of negligence; (2) increased incentive to promote product safety; 
(3) the superior position of manufacturers to prevent and insure 
against injury; (4) more efficient risk-spreading of the victim's loss 
among the purchasers of products; and (5) the obligation assumed 
by manufacturers and distributors who must sacrifice something for 
the benefit they derive from consumer spending.336 The significance 
of these factors is not exclusive to products liability cases; each has 
its place in the analysis of wrongful life cases. 
1. Difficulty in Proving Negligence 
One rationale for imposing strict liability upon the seller of a 
product is based on the difficulty of proof encountered by a plaintiff 
335. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
The "prophylactic" factor of preventing future harm has been quite 
important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only 
with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrong-
doer. When the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants 
realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong 
incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one 
reason for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing 
that incentive. 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 317, at 25; see also supra note 253. 
336. Cj. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965) (listing several 
justifications). For a general discussion of the various policy considerations 
underlying strict products liability, see generally David G. Owen, Rethinking 
the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 V AND. L. REv. 681 (1980) and 
William C. Powers, Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict 
Liability, 62 N.C. L. REv. 415 (1984). 
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in the typical products case. According to this rationale, the manu-
facturer of a product is uniquely insulated in its manufacturing and 
design processes so as to make it very difficult for the plaintiff to 
access the proof necessary to prove negligence.337 Essentially, this rule 
suggests that because the plaintiff may encounter difficulty meeting 
the breach of duty element of the tort, the courts will relieve her of 
that burden and will require only that she prove the product was 
defective or abnormally dangerous at the time it left the seller's 
control. 338 
The courts have made clear that it is difficult if not impossible 
for the wrongful life plaintiff to prove the injury element of the 
tort. Yet the problem of proof that warrants giving special treatment 
to plaintiffs in products cases is no different than the problem of 
proof encountered by the wrongful life plaintiff. The result is the 
same: the wrongful life plaintiff cannot overcome the insurmountable 
problem of proving injury, a difficulty that, concededly, has not 
been caused by the complexity of the defendant's conduct, but rather 
is imposed by the courts who refuse to hold that life is an injury. 
2. Incentive to Act Prudently: An Economic Perspective to 
Genetic Counseling 
Under traditional negligence law, the injurer and the victim are 
each accountable for the activity that results in injury, and changes 
in activity that could avoid the injury. The injurer is motivated to 
avoid accidents by the prohibitive cost of a legal judgment and the 
more economical means of avoiding the accident before it occurs. 
Similarly, the potential victim has an incentive to change her activity 
level, since a failure to do so may be deemed contributory negligence 
and may bar any recovery. 
337. Professor Powers suggests that the difficulty of proof rationale is the only one 
that supports the distinction between sales and services in strict products liability 
cases. Powers, supra note 336, at 426. 
338. See, e.g., id .. The related tort concept of res ipsa loquitur operates in much 
the same way. The plaintiff alleging medical malpractice sometimes cannot 
identify the particular defendant who caused the injury, or, in other cases, 
cannot causally link the complained of injury with the surgical treatment she 
underwent. Res ipsa allows a plaintiff to proceed with her negligence action 
and imposes on the physician an inference that the complained of harm does 
not ordinarily occur absent negligence. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 208 P.2d 445 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1949). 
Again·, the justification for this doctrine is premised on the inherent difficulty 
of proof-proof of a culpable party and/or proof of causation. Similarly, the 
wrongful life plaintiff cannot prove in the logical or philosophical sense her 
injury; however, she usually has no problem proving duty, breach, and cau-
sation. The plaintiff's damages are tangible, though her harm arguably is not: 
1993] Wrongful Life 255 
The efficiency of strict liability can be judged by identifying the 
activity levels of both the potential injurer and the potential victim 
in a particular circumstance and determining whether a change in 
activity level by either. but particularly the victim, will promote 
accident avoidance.339 Strict liability is particularly suited to those 
activities where the cost of accident avoidance exceeds the expected 
judgment costs so that the injurer has no incentive to take precau-
tions, and where activity level changes by potential victims would 
neither effect accident avoidance nor be economically practical. 34'0 
The genetic counselor must undertake very little by way of 
activity level modification to prevent defective counseling. All that 
is usually required is more careful scrutiny before giving advice to 
the patient. In the typical wrongful life case, the plaintiff is not 
alleging injury caused by a defective medical instrument, drug or 
other substance used in treatment, nor is she challenging the basis 
of a medical decision involving affirmative medical treatment. The 
asserted defect in treatment is the absolute failure to pass along 
information upon which only the parents could act. Thus, the medical 
provider who fails to render appropriate genetic counseling is not 
effectuating a risk inherent in the medical treatment, but is creating 
the risk independent of the standard established by the medical 
community. Applying strict liability against genetic counselors does 
not establish a higher standard than ordinary,,- care for the practice, 
and only serves to ensure that the standard is realized by both doctor 
. and patient. 
339. POSNER, supra note 253, at 160-61. Professor Guido Calabresi takes the analysis 
one step further by focusing on "which of the parties to the accident is in the 
best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and 
accident avoidance costs .... " Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 319, at 1060. 
Accordingly, Judge Posner's analysis would be expanded to focus not only on 
whether the risk of accident itself justifies a reduction of activity level, but 
also on who best can evaluate their activity levels. Again, in the medical 
malpractice context, to answer Calabresi's query, the medical provider is in a 
far superior position because of her specialized training and experience. Vandall, 
supra note 319, at 36. In this regard, however, it is important not to place 
undue weight on the provider's unique ability to evaluate the accident costs 
since, particularly when wrongful life is alleged, the parents and their child are 
in a better position to assess the pecuniary and nonpecuniary harm resulting 
from the child's handicapped life. 
340. POSNER, supra note 253, at 163. Although I use Professor Posner's economic 
theory to promote the application of strict liability to wrongful life claims, 
other commentators criticize Posner's approach and suggest that adjustments 
in activity level are exactly what strict liability seeks to avoid, since those 
valued activities which cannot be made safer by the injurer at reasonable cost 
are most appropriately within the scope of strict liability. Although this 
assumption may be true of inherently dangerous activities, activity level changes 
by medical providers is the best means of avoiding defective genetic counseling. 
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In examining the costs to the genetic counselor in adopting more 
exa'cting standards for information giving, and the possible costs for 
her failure to render proper counseling, it is clear that there is little 
incentive for her to take the additional precautions needed to avoid 
genetic malpractice. Unfortunately for the analysis, this result comes 
from the inability of the legal system to redress the harm to the 
child for the provider's mistake; it does not come from internal cost 
inefficiencies of the care itself which might otherwise render such 
care economically impractical. This brings us full circle to the concept 
of deterrence, which is part of both negligence and strict liability 
law. Accordingly, one might rightfully ask whether the imposition 
of strict liability is justified merely because other forms of tort law 
are unable to provide adequate redress to potential victims. As seen 
in other contexts, the answer appears to be in the affirmative. 341 
3. Genetic Counselor as Best Accident Avoider 
The genetic counselor has the ability to avoid the accident, but 
has little economic incentive to do so. The wrongful life plaintiff, 
on the other hand, has no ability to avoid harm, but much incentive 
to do so. The unborn patient is powerless in the genetic counseling 
process. Her life or nonlife, therefore, depends on the acts or 
omissions of the counselor. The child's parents, who are also patients 
of the medical provider, on the other hand, are not completely 
powerless, and may participate in accident avoidance at relatively 
low economic cost by seeking a second opinion. In many instances, 
however, the element of time which is critical to the medical provi-
der's ability to diagnose the genetic condition, and the parents' ability 
to act to avoid conception or procure an abortion, militates against 
the plausibility of seeking a second opinion. 342 
4. Genetic Counselor as Best Risk Allocator 
Notwithstanding the- one-on-one relationship between the genetic 
counselor and the patient (which some commentators argue prevents 
medical providers from spreading the risk of loss among the entire 
population), 343 the counselor's ability to spread the risk of loss 
341. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
342. See supra notes 179-81 for a description of various prenatal diagnostic proce-
dures. 
343. These commentators argue that because the medical provider is unable to 
spread the risk among the entire population, the distribution of risk among 
her patients unfairly imposes on relatively few people the entire cost of the 
risk. See, e.g., Crowley & Johannsen, supra note 329, at 1457 ("Retailers have 
a cost-minimizing effect on the loss reallocation, whereas doctors and hospitals 
will have a cost-maximizing effect."); see also Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 
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remains far superior to that of the patient-consumer's. The counselor 
usually maintains medical malpractice insurance whereas the patient 
cannot insure against the eventuality of defective treatment. 344 Like-
wise, premium increases for malpractice insurance can be passed on· 
to patients by way of increased fees. 34s Simply because the provider 
has insurance should not categorically force the burden of loss upon 
her, although it is one factor to consider. 346 
5. The Obligation of the Genetic Counselor as a Market 
Participant 
For many courts, the question as to with whom responsibility 
for the risk of injury rests depends on the benefits one derives from 
the risk-causing activity. Where the actor derives substantial benefit 
from consumer spending, the benefit obtained requires the assump-
tion of additional responsibility toward those from whom the benefit 
is gained. Courts have found that a seller's responsibility to the 
consumer originates from the benefit it derives from those who 
purchase its products. 347 
According to this approach, the genetic counselor owes allegiance 
to the consumer-patient to assume the consequences of improper 
genetic counseling without becoming the insurer of perfect results. 
Where an avoidable act or omission results in inaccurate genetic 
information which is relied on by parents to their detriment, the 
539, 545 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (service providers generally do not 
have the assets, volume of business or area of contacts which would allow 
them to spread the risk of loss in the same manner as a manufacturer or 
retailer of a product), a/I'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), afl'd per curiam, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969). 
344. Although the medical provider is clearly in a better position to procure insurance 
to cover the risk of malpractice, some commentators propose medical providers 
should require that their patients insure against the eventuality of malpractice. 
RICHARD POSNER, TORT LAW, CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 517-18 (1982); 
Vandall, supra note 319, at 37. 
345. Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637, 643 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) 
(Botter, J., dissenting), a/I'd per curiam, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969); James M. 
Brown, Social Resource Allocation Through Medical Malpractice, 6 WILLIA-
METTE L.J. 235, 243-45 (1970); Hadley, supra note 329, at 1372. But see 
Crowley & Johannsen, supra note 329, at 1457 (arguing that medical providers 
are inefficient loss reallocators). 
346. Whether the reallocation of risk through increased insurance premiums is an 
efficient means of risk spreading is an age-old debate that is beyond the scope 
of this Article. For further discussio~ of the issue, see generally JEFFREY 
O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: IN1URIES, INSURANCE, AND 
INJUSTICE (1987). 
347. See, e.g., Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 782 
P.2d il87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. 
Rptr. 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). 
258 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 22 
medical provider as a market participant should assume the risk of 
loss. The risk is proportionate to the number of patients the provider 
sees. The more patients she sees, the more risk she assumes. The 
increased risk is the price she must pay to society for achieving a 
successful practice. This price is not an unreasonable one, especially 
since the counselor controls the extent of her liability. The more 
careful she is the less risk she encounters. 
D. Judicial Rationales For Not Imposing Strict Liability on 
Medical Providers 
Relatively few cases have addressed the application of strict tort 
liability to pure service transactions;348 more have addressed the 
situation where the faulty service is a direct result of a defective 
product.349 Of the handful of reported decisions addressing the ap-
plication of strict liability to defective medical services not involving 
the use of a product,350 several are worthy of discussion. 
348. In such cases, courts have generally declined to apply strict liability. See, e.g., 
Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954) (test hole driller); Swett v. Gribaldo, 
Jones & Assocs., 115 Cal. Rptr. 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (soil engineer); City 
of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Minn. 1978) (en banc) 
(architect); see also infra note 353 (listing cases involving medical services). 
Other courts have held similar professionals strictly liable for defectively 
rendered services. See, e.g., Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 151 So. 2d 767 (Ala. 
1963) (per curiam) (civil engineers); cf. Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit 
Edison, 196 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (utility company). The non-
discretionary nature of the services at issue played a significant role in the 
courts' decisions to impose strict liability. 
349. These hybrid sales-service transactions arise in many settings, and are handled 
by courts in diverse ways. See Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 
1969) (beautician held strictly liable for burning customer's scalp with defective 
hair product). But see Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1984) 
(physician not strictly liable for prescribing injury-causing pharmaceutical); 
Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967) (dentist 
not strictly liable for use of defective hypodermic needle), aff'd sub nom. 
Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd per 
curiam, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969); Coyle v. Richarson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 
1383 (Pa. 1991) (pharmacist not strictly liable for filling prescription with 
defective drug); Rogers v. Miles Labs., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346 (Wash. 1991) 
(blood bank not strictly liable for distributing tainted blood product). 
Hybrid cases are irrelevant to the issue of whether strict liability is appropriate 
in the context of medical services because most of those decisions hinge on 
the underlying product defect and the server's ability to know of its existence 
before the product is used. See generally Marc L. Carmichael, Annotation, 
Liability of Hospital or Medical Practitioner Under Doctrine of Strict Liability 
in Tort, or Breach of Warranty, for Harm Caused by Drug, Medical Instru-
ment, or Similar Device Used in Treating Patient, 54 A.L.R.3d 258 (1974 & 
Supp. 1993). 
350. See infra note 353 and supra note 348. 
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In Hoven v. Kelble,m the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled 
that the plaintiffs could not maintain an action in strict liability 
against a physician for defective medical treatment during a lung 
biopsy.352 The court analyzed the policy arguments for and against 
treating professional services and sales differently, and held that 
imposing liability against those rendering professional medical services 
could have unforeseeable adverse consequences on society's ability 
to obtain specialized medical care. m 
In Helling v. Carey,354 an ophthalmologist was held liable for 
failing to test for glaucoma in a patient who was below the age 
where existing medical standards deemed such testing medically in-
dicated. 3S5 Although the provider's care did not fall below the estab-
lished standard of care in the profession, the court, after considering 
the relatively low risk, minimal cost, and nondiscretionary nature of 
the provider's decision to employ the test, deemed the existing 
standard too low.356 The concurring opinion in Helling, however, 
suggests that the rationale for the court's decision was based on 
principles of strict liability and not on negligence, as the majority 
had suggested. 357 
It seem[s] to me we are, in reality, imppsing liability, 
because, in choosing between an innocent plaintiff and a 
doctor, who acted reasonably according to his specialty but 
who could have prevented the full effects of this disease by 
administering a simple, harmless test and treatment, the 
plaintiff should not have to bear the risk of loss. As such, 
351. 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977). 
352. [d. at 393. 
353. [d. at 391-92. Other jurisdictions have taken a similar approach and have 
denied recovery for claims of defective medical services premised on strict 
liability. See Dubin v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 415 N.E.2d 350 (Ill. 
1980) (physician who overradiated tumor with x-rays not strictly liable); Barbee 
v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (optometrist who improperly fitted 
patient with contact lens not strictly liable); Nevauex v. Park Place Hosp., 
Inc., 656 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (hospital not strictly liable for 
misapplication of radiation treatments); Black v. Gundersen Clinic, Ltd., 448 
N.W.2d 247 (Wis. 1989) (physician not strictly liable for failing to disclose 
risks of surgery). Some states have excluded by statute strict liability actions 
against medical providers in some situations. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
32-1481A (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2(a) (West 1993); LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:2797 (West 1993); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 459Oi, § 6.02 
(Vernon Supp. 1991). 
354. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (en banc), superseded by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4.24.290 (West 1988). 
355. [d. at 983. 
356. [d. 
357. [d. at 984 (Utter, J., concurring). 
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imposition of liability approaches that of strict liability. 358 
A similar view was expressed by Justice Tobriner in his concur-
ring opinion in Clark v. Gibbons. 3S9 Clark involved malpractice claims 
against an orthopaedic surgeon for prematurely terminating a spinal 
operation, and against an anesthesiologist for failing to use the proper 
anesthesia which had worn off before the operation was terminated. 360 
The plaintiff was awarded damages based on res ipsa loquitur,361 
although Justice Tobriner argued against application of a negligence 
standard in favor of one that. would impose strict liability:362 
A system openly imposing liability without fault without 
any pretense of negligence . . . can avoid unwarranted im-
putations of fault while permitting the rational development 
of badly needed doctrine. Simultaneously, such a system 
can insure that the burdens of unexplained accidents will 
not fall primarily upon the helpless but will be borne instead 
by those best able to spread their cost among all who benefit 
from the surgical operations in which these misfortunes 
occur. 363 
One of the most persuasive arguments against the application of 
strict liability to professional service transactions is the difficulty of 
judging the professional's behavior since her decisions are not con-
sistent in a given circumstance and depend on a case-by-case evalu-
ation of the circumstances which often require a spontaneous response. 
Strict liability, critics contend, would only lead to judicial second-
guessing of the professional's judgment, which is counterproductive 
to aggressive medical decision-making.364 Although this may well be 
358. Id. at 983 (Utter, J., concurring). 
359. 426 P .2d 525 (Cal. 1967). 
360. Id. at 528-29. 
361. Id. at 535. 
362. Id. at 539 (Tobriner, J., concurring). 
~.M • 
364. E.g., Allen H. Cox, III, Note, The Medical Profession and Strict Liability for 
Defective Products-A Limited Extension, 17 HAsTINGS L.J. 359, 366 (1965). 
The rationale against imposing strict liability upon professionals is well stated 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 
N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978) (en bane): 
Architects, doctors, engineers, attorneys, and others deal in somewhat 
inexact sciences and are continually called upon to exercise their skilled 
judgment in order to anticipate and provide for random factors which 
are incapable of precise measurement. The indeterminate nature of 
these factors makes it impossible for professional service people to 
gauge them with complete accuracy in every instance. Thus, doctors 
cannot promise that every operation will be successful; a lawyer can 
never be certain that a contract he drafts is without latent ambiguity; 
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true of certain medical decision-making, it is incompatible to other, 
purely "mechanical" treatments.36S For example, an erroneous inter-
pretation of test results or a failure to disclose a known or knowable 
risk of treatment is not usually a matter of professional judgment, 
but is purely a matter of mechanical oversight. 366 Under these cir-
cumstances strict liability would not interfere with professional de-
cision-making since there is little or nothing for the provider to 
contemplate other than how and to whom the information should 
be conveyed.367 This approach of distinguishing between medical 
treatment and medical services was employed by one federal court 
that refused to adopt the "technical or artificial distinction between 
sales and services" and held several hospitals liable for negligent 
treatment of the plaintiff who was injured in a motor vehicle accident 
caused by an improperly installed tire. 
In Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & CO.,368 the court bifurcated the 
types of medical services rendered in a hospital into professional 
medical services and "mechanical or administrative services," and 
held the latter type subject to strict liability when defectively ren-
dered.369 The court reasoned that defective mechanical and adminis-
trative hospital services may result in serious consequences to a 
patient; the patient has no control over the quality of the service; 
and the inexactitude of medical science requires at very least that the 
doctor have the proper facilities with which to render the maximally 
and an architect cannot be certain that a structural design will interact 
with natural forces as anticipated. Because of the inescapable possi-
bility of error which inheres in these services, the law has traditionally 
required, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and 
judgment which can be reasonably expected from similarly situated 
professionals. 
Id. at 423. 
365. Greenfield, supra note 318, at 700. 
366. Only when the medical provider fails to disclose a risk because she has 
concluded that disclosure would be harmful to the patient does the provider 
exercise professional judgment in withholding the information. Use of this 
"therapeutic privilege" to withhold known risks of treatment is rarely justified. 
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 317, at 192; see also Alan Meisel, The 
"Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between 
Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 413 (the 
therapeutic privilege must be restrictively framed so physicians do not substitute 
their own judgment for the patient's in every instance of medical decision-
making). 
367. See Jane P. Mallor, Liability Without Fault for Professional Services: Toward 
a New Standard of Professional Accountability, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 474, 
493-94 (1978); see also supra Part III.B; cj. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 
983 (Wash. 1974) (en banc). 
368. 355 F. Supp. 1065, 1066 (B.D. Wis. 1973). 
369. The court did not address the applicability of strict liability to professional 
medical services. Id. at 1066-67. 
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attainable standard of care. 370 Thus, a court entertaining a claim for 
strict liability must make an ad hoc determination of the type of 
services alleged to be defective, and must take into account the 
particular facts of the case to ensure that the patient is not seeking 
to impose no-fault liability for a failure to cure.371 
The court's decision in Johnson offers an insightful approach 
that is appropriate for some if not all wrongful life cases. An 
administrative hospital service is any service the hospital must per-
form at the request of a physician which, although critical to the 
patient's treatment, does not affect the exercise of medical discretion 
in rendering actual treatment. Genetic counseling can be seen as at 
least primarily mechanical in nature. Little professional discretion is 
left with the provider to decide whether or not to disclose genetic 
information. 372 This is particularly true in situations where the pro-
vider fails to inquire about a woman's maternal age, has carelessly 
mishandled blood samples or has misinterpreted otherwise unambig-
uous test results. In those situations, imposition of strict liability is 
appropriate. 
Unlike cases where courts have decided that a service was so 
inextricably linked to other discretionary treatment decisions that 
strict liability should not be imposed, incorrect dissemination of 
information is not merely a part of genetic counseling; it usually 
represents the entire extent of the "treatme~t." Particularly in those 
cases where the provider's omission involves the failure to inquire-
failure to take a family history or failure to prescribe diagnostic 
testing-the imposition of strict liability will likely have little effect 
on the progress of medicine. 
The medical provider defending against a wrongful life claim 
does not defend on the ground that she did not deviate from the 
standard of care; rather her defense usually rests on the plaintiff's 
inability to prove injury. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to 
deny a strict liability action premised on wrongful life because of its 
possible consequences on the provision of care since the physician's 
or counselor's conduct is unquestionably culpable notwithstanding 
the plaintiff's inability to prove injury. 
One suggested consequence of extending strict liability to medical 
services is a substantial increase in litigation, resulting in increased 
health care costs. Concededly, this is a difficult phenomenon to 
predict, although it appears unlikely that this consequence will be 
realized in wrongful life claims premised on strict liability in tort. 
The number of cases initiated would be no greater than the number 
370. Id. at 1067. 
371. Id. 
372. See supra Part III.B. 
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of negligence actions presently brought for wrongful life. Relieving 
wrongful life plaintiffs of their burden of proving injury to a phil-
osophical certainty will encourage early settlement of legitimate claims 
since the defendant no longer will have the issue of injury on which 
to hang her hat. 
The effect of a strict liability judgment against a medical provider 
for failed genetic counseling may not, as some propose, cause across-
the-board cost increases for genetic care. 373 It is unlikely that rate 
hikes for malpractice insurance throughout the specialty will result 
in unaffordable health care. Instead, those providers who act negli-
gently will bear the brunt of the economic fallout for their neglect 
by having to answer to disciplinary committees within the specialty. 
These committees will be forced to regulate the conduct of its 
members in order to keep malpractice insurance rates within the 
specialty from rising to unaffordable levels. 374 Other than outright 
removal from the specialty, pecuniary sanction is the most feasible 
way to discipline habitually careless providers, which, in turn, will 
force them to charge higher fees for their services. 
The positive effect of this is that the consumer will be motivated 
to seek substitute health care that is cheaper and probably safer. 
Hence, the negligent provider will treat fewer patients, which will 
373. See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 n.17 (Wis. 1977); Greenfield, 
supra note 318, at 687. 
374. Internal provider discipline appears to be the most feasible means to sanction 
the careless provider, since the claims experience of individual providers is 
rarely considered by insurance companies when setting insurance rates. See 
Andrew D. Freedman & John M. Freedman, No-Fault Cerebral Palsy Insur-
ance: An Alternative to the Obstetrical Malpractice Lottery, 14 J. HEALTH 
POL., POL'y & LAW 707, 714 (1989); Cynthia C. Gallup, Can No-Fault 
Compensation of Impaired Infants Alleviate the Malpractice Crisis in Obstet-
rics?, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & LAW 691, 696 n.8 (1989). But see Blaine 
F. Nye & Alfred E. Hofflander, Experience Rating in Medical Professional 
Liability Insurance, 60 J. RISK & INS. 150 (1988) (proposing that prior history 
of doctors should be used to determine insurance premiums). So~e carriers 
provide incentives for the practice of more careful medicine by offering claim-
free discounts (which generally range from 5 to 30%) to those providers who 
have had no malpractice claims against them, and disincentive by assessing 
surcharges (which may raise an insured's premium up to 300%) against those 
who are habitually negligent. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Smarr, Chair-
man, Data Sharing Committee of the Physicians Insurance Association of 
America (August 20, 1991). Realistically, however, a provider would have to 
be negligent to an unusually high degree before a surcharge would be assessed, 
especially when considering that only one in ten acts of malpractice results in 
the filing of a legal malpractice claim. PATRiCIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 24 (1985). From this, one 
begins to realize that malpractice insurance is a particularly efficient means of 
spreading risk, so much so that individual physicians feel no real effect on 
their rates from their own claims experience. 
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reduce the likelihood of future carelessness. 37s The market will adjust 
the allocation of risk according to the likelihood that the risk will 
come to fruition, and will discipline the careless provider by pricing 
her services out of the market.376 
This economic theory presupposes (incorrectly according to some 
who advance the theory of health at any cost)377 that patients choose 
their providers according to the fees they charge, and not so much 
because of their reputation and experience. As with any consumer 
product, reputation and experience in the industry lends credibility 
to the product and enters into the consumer's purchasing decision. 
At some point, however, a substantial disparity in price between the 
reputable product and one whose price is significantly lower will 
motivate the consumer to purchase the cheaper alternative in the 
hope that its quality will be comparable to the higher priced product, 
resulting in a net savings.378 
The same is likely true for consumer decisions regarding medical 
care. A provider's reputation, although a factor in the patient's initial 
decision to engage her services, may become less significant if the 
price for those services is not compatible with the patient's ability 
to pay for them. The patient is not oblivious to the cost of her 
treatment. She must either pay the provider directly, or she must 
make copayment if she is fortunate enough to have health insurance. 
Thus, the patient is affected by the cost of the provider's services, 
and will be motivated to seek cheaper alternatives when the provider's 
fees prove too burdensome or when they appear disproportionate to 
the fees charged by similar specialists in the field. 
The suggested strict liability approach to wrongful life is used 
to relieve the plaintiff of her burden of proving legal injury and 
375. POSNER, supra note 253, at 166. 
376. Some commentators, however, question whether increases in insurance rates 
would give the provider adequate incentive to avoid accidents, because the 
physician may pass the increased costs on to the patient. See Note, Comparative 
Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141, 1156 
n.78 (1975). 
377. Some commentators argue that individuals seldom shop for medical care using 
fees as the sole or primary criterion. Adding strength to this contention is the 
reality that many patients are insured or seek medical care in emergency 
situations where there is neither the need nor the time to deliberate on cost. 
Similarly, few patients can anticipate what the diagnosis will be and what tests 
or procedures may be necessary to achieve the diagnosis. Crowley & Johannsen, 
supra note 329, at 1457. 
378. Concededly, such "risk-taking" is less likely to occur when one's life is on the 
line. Especially for routine, nonlife threatening procedures, however, a patient 
is more apt to shop around. In fact, many health insurance plans do the 
shopping for the patient by restricting covered treatments to those rendered by 
participating providers, or by limiting the payment of fees to what the plan 
considers reasonable and customary. 
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does not promote judicial second-guessing of the provider's profes-
sional medical judgment. The standard of care remains relevant to 
the strict liability analysis. Strict liability sh'ould not be imposed upon 
a medical provider whenever the plaintiff cannot sustain her burden 
of proving any of the elements required in negligence actions. There 
must always be proof of a duty owed and a breach of that duty, 
essentially amounting to a showing of fault. 379 Imposing strict liability 
on genetic counseling is more than an escape device for disadvantaged 
plaintiffs; it is a more efficient method of risk-spreading and accident 
avoidance than the law of negligence, which has proved incompatible 
with the injury element of the tort. 
Application of strict liability to medical professionals is not a 
novel concept; legislators and academicians for years have proposed 
such an approach.380 Unfortunately, the idea has been greeted with 
undue judicial reluctance. 3s1 Two states, however-Virginia and Flor-
ida-have enacted legislation providing no fault compensation for 
children born with birth-related neurological injuries caused by the 
negligence of obstetricians during the delivery process.382 These no-
fault laws were enacted to counter skyrocketing rates and the outright 
unavailability of malpractice insurance.383 'Both states' laws require 
very serious handicaps as a condition precedent to recovery. The 
Virginia plan requires that the claimant be "permanently nonambu-
latory, aphasic, incontinent, and in need of assistance in all phases 
of daily living"; and the Florida plan requires that the claimant be 
"permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. "384 
379. See supra notes 318 and 333 and accompanying text. 
380. See, e.g., S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (sponsored by Senators Inouye 
and Kennedy proposing no-fault compensation for injuries sustained from the 
provision of health care services). At least one commentator contends that the 
doctrine of informed consent is simply another means of imposing strict liability 
upon medical providers. See Alan Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for 
Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability By Way of Informed 
Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51, 123-32 (1977). 
381. See supra notes 348 and 353 and accompanying text. 
382. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990.& Supp. 1993); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 776.301-.316 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). These laws work much 
like workers' compensation laws and essentially impose strict liability on the 
provider with a limit on compensable injury to the special medical and 
habilitative care necessitated by the handicap. The plans also provide for 
payment of reasonable attorneys' fees and wage stipends for those age 18 and 
over who are unable to work because of their handicap. Gallup, supra note 
374, at 693. These programs are financed by a tax assessed against medical 
providers. Id. 
383. Gallup, supra note 374, at 693-94. 
384. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 776.301-.316 (West 1986 & SUpp. 1993). 
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Although these laws present their own shortcomings,38S each has 
achieved what they were enacted to do-reduce malpractice insurance 
rates while providing guaranteed compensation for seriously impaired 
newborns injured at the hands of careless medical providers.386 These 
laws serve as good models for the concept of strict liability for 
wrongful life claims and suggest that strict liability is a feasible 
alternative to negligence as a means of redressing claims which might 
otherwise bring with them profound social and economic conse-
quences. 
Strict liability does not resolve all the uncertainties surrounding 
the child's claim for wrongful life. The issue of damage calculation 
still remains. At very least, the child is entitled to the readily 
measurable special damages which the law is well suited to impose 
upon the defendant. This Article further proposes that nonpecuniary 
pain and suffering damages are calculable and should be awarded in 
those circumstances where the child is born with a severe handicap. 
Although many courts express extreme reluctance over the uncertain-
ties flowing from the assessment of nonpecuniary damages in wrong-
ful life claims, those uncertainties may be overcome in the same way 
that courts have dealt with equally difficult damage calculations for 
emotional distress, loss of consortium, loss of profits and loss of 
enjoyment of life's pleasures. Several states have accomplished this 
by placing statutory ceilings on the amount of noneconomic damages 
a plaintiff may recover. 387 
Some will argue that any proposition that strict liability should 
be applied to genetic counseling misses the mark engraved by social 
priority. Rather than adjust the legal and medical systems to 'cater 
to the wrongful life claim, we must take the less drastic alternative 
of barring the action as a matter of law. The lack of evidence as to 
the adverse social and scientific ramifications flowing from acceptance 
of wrongful life claims suggests that the latter alternative is the more 
drastic of the two. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Opponents of the wrongful life cause of action maintain that 
society should not expect so much from justice and the legal system-
that society's expanded expectation of justice is undesirable in a 
world where, they. argue, the sanctity of life is a fortiori superior to 
freedom of choice. Society, however, is justified in expanding its 
expectation of justice in light of the expanded role technology plays 
385. See Gallup, supra note 374, at 703-04. 
386. For other proposals for imposing strict liability against obstetricians, see 
generally Freedman &Freedman, supra note 374. 
387. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
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in the creation and perfection of life. Individuals should have the 
opportunity to take advantage of these technologies through their 
medical providers who are, in essence, their brokers in the market 
of genetic technology. 
It is no doubt difficult for many to embrace a concept which 
permits individuals to stand before a court and argue post hoc that 
their lives on whole are not worth the pain they experience. The 
difficulties of this concept for most, however, are as out of touch 
with the reality of the child's life as is their ability to weigh the 
burdens of the plaintiff's impaired existence with nonlife. Those who 
are fortunate enough to be free of· genetic handicaps cannot fully 
identify with the child's condition. If, however, you would ask these 
same people if they would choose life or death if their lives would 
bring great pain and suffering, many would choose death without 
any rational basis for the decision that death is preferable. 
Wrongful life cannot be rationalized against every notion of 
justice and being. Nonetheless, the concept behind the action-that 
some lives are not worth living-is one whose time has come. Just 
as courts have expanded the concept of duty to the unborn where 
the progression of the law paralleled the development of medical 
technologies, so too should courts expand the rights of the unborn 
to benefit from today's technology. To receive anything less is to 
sustain compensable injury. 
The metaphysical dilemma of life versus nonexistence has un-
necessarily interfered with the rights of the unborn to recover for 
the deprivation of state-of-the-art medical care. It is not necessary 
to labor over such a comparison. Instead, courts need only focus on 
the deprivation of information to the parent or guardian ad litem. 
Parents of the prospective child have the most complex and 
agonizing decision to make when deciding between allowing the child 
to be born into a life of suffering and not bringing her into the 
world at all. The parents' decision involves a weighing of possible 
benefits and burdens to the child born with the impairment, and the 
parents' own ability to live with a child who requires extraordinary 
attention, and who will likely die prematurely. 
Courts have well recognized the difficulties of such a decision, 
and have struggled with the same questions parents must ask them-
selves, such as: When a child will not live a healthy or full life, is 
it better that the parent allow it to be born, or should they avoid or 
terminate the life? Whose interest must the parents take into account 
when making such a decision? Is it possible for parents to make this 
decision without placing their own interests before the child's? How 
severe must the impairment be before it is possible to say with some 
certainty that life is an injury? The queries, although difficult, are 
not insurmountable for the parents and, thus, need not be for the 
courts. Once the parents have made their decision, it should be 
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respected by the medical provider as the decision of both parents 
and child, and accorded legal protection through pecuniary sanction. 
In time, science and biotechnology may help parents to achieve 
the creation of the perfect baby, free of the congenital infirmities 
that are currently the subject of wrongfuHife and other birth-related 
causes of action. The law, functioning as it does, will inevitably 
embrace those scientific advances by modifying the common law 
standard of care for medical providers to follow when rendering 
treatment or advice to prospective parents. It is understandable that 
courts would prefer to postpone consideration Of the legitimacy of 
such novel causes of action in the hope that science itself will resolve 
the issue.388 The unfortunate reality, however, is that the ability to 
prevent and treat most genetic disorders is far from a scientific 
reality. Courts must confront the issue head on, and must encourage 
the pace of technology to achieve the maximally attainable state of 
medical care by recognizing the wrongful life action. 
388. The future holds promising for the alleviation of many genetic diseases. At 
the center of recent scientific efforts is the Human Genome Project, a multi-
billion dollar, federally back~d, worldwide research effort with a goal of 
mapping the location of every chromosome, gene and base pair of DNA that 
make up the human cell. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
MAPPING OUR GENEs-THE FEDERAL GENOME PROJECTS: How VAST, How 
FAST? O'TA-BA-373, at 1 (1988). It is estimated that there are between 50,000 
and 100,000 human genes of which approximately 1,700 have already been 
mapped, id. at 9, including the genes for Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, 
and sickle-cell trait. [d. By identifying the location of every gene, the Human 
Genome Project is expected to have a profound impact on biomedical science 
and will enable medical providers to treat and prevent many of the genetic 
diseases that afflict mankind. [d. at I. For a comprehensive report on the 
Human Genome Project, see generally U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF 
ENERGY RESEARCH, HUMAN GENOME, 1989-90 PROGRAM REpORT (1990); U.S. 
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MAPPING OUR GENES-THE 
FEDERAL GENOME PROJECTS: How VAST, How FAST? OTA-BA-373 (1988). 
Perhaps such scientific advancement will eventually render the wrongful life 
action a nullity, since healthy life, as opposed to no life at all, may be the 
otherwise attainable condition of the handicapped child. See supra note 7. 
